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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
This article broadly identifies and then briefly examines tribal 
laws that prohibit sex discrimination and secondarily addresses laws 
that make sex-based distinctions.  As explained below, the project is 
somewhat limited in scope due to the lack of widespread availability of 
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many tribes’ laws.  
Specifically, this article addresses tribal equal protection guaran-
tees as well as all types of tribal statutory and constitutional laws that 
explicitly prohibit sex discrimination.  It also discusses tribal case law 
addressing such discrimination, including case law addressing equal 
protection guarantees, cases interpreting tribal codes or policies, and 
case law creating tribal common law. 
A. The Indian Civil Rights Act 
Any article that attempts to comprehensively explore tribal laws 
that protect against discrimination based on a suspect classification 
has to address, in some measure, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),1 
the 1968 law through which Congress imposed many Bill of Rights 
obligations, including equal protection, on Indian tribes.2  This is 
particularly true of tribal sex discrimination laws3 because, as ex-
plained below, the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez4 led to a widespread, monolithic impression that 
tribes were not protective of the rights of women. 
Although the final version of the ICRA reflects important com-
promises between protection of the tribal right to self-government 
 
 1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (2006).  Federal courts have since held, in addition 
to the protections imposed under the ICRA, that some federal anti-discrimination 
statutes of general applicability apply to tribes, while others do not.  See, e.g., Arostook 
Band of Micmacs v. Ryan, 484 F.3d 41, 56 (1st Cir. 2007) (reciting the fact that tribes 
are specifically excluded from the definition of “employer” under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act, but holding that particular tribe to be subject to state employment 
laws); San Manuel Band of Mission Indians v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 475 F.3d 
1306, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing cases addressing the applicability of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to tribes).  
Aside from tribal enforcement of the ICRA, tribal enforcement of federal statutes 
pursuant to federal law is beyond the reach of this article.  Additionally, it should be 
noted that Nevada v. Hicks has called into question tribal courts’ ability to hear federal 
law cases other than those involving the ICRA.  533 U.S. 353, 367 (2001) (“This 
historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction over 
federal-law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal courts.”). 
 2. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303.   
 3. I generally use the term “sex” rather than “gender” throughout this article 
because it refers more precisely to distinctions and discrimination based on biological 
sex, in other words based on being male or female.  See, e.g., Lara Stemple, Male Rape 
& Human Rights, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 605, 619 nn.138–39 (2009).  However, as explained 
infra Part I.E, my searches of sources included the word “gender,” which is 
increasingly employed by legislative drafters and courts as a milder substitute for the 
word “sex.” 
 4. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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and individual rights,5 the initial motivation for the statute was a 
perception that tribal courts were not adequately protecting the rights 
of individual Indians.6  Ten years after the Act was passed, in Santa 
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,7 the Supreme Court concluded that the civil 
rights obligations that the ICRA imposed on tribes could not be 
enforced via a private right of action in federal court, except through 
the limited remedy of habeas corpus.  As explained further below, 
although the decision was a strong victory for tribal sovereignty, it also 
arguably had the unintended effect of fueling both prejudice against 
tribal courts and future judicial incursions on tribal sovereignty.8 
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Santa Clara v. Martinez 
Martinez was a sex-based equal protection case brought under the 
ICRA.  The plaintiff in Martinez was a mother whose daughters could 
not be enrolled in the Tribe under current tribal enrollment 
provisions, which allowed enrollment of children whose fathers had 
married outside the Tribe but not children whose mothers had 
married nonmembers.9  The Supreme Court’s decision meant that 
Ms. Martinez could only sue for this purported violation of the ICRA’s 
equal protection guarantee in tribal court.10   
 
 5. See, e.g., id. at 62 (“Two distinct and competing purposes are manifest in the 
provisions of the ICRA: In addition to its objective of strengthening the position of 
individual tribal members vis-à-vis the tribe, Congress also intended to promote the 
well-established federal ‘policy of furthering Indian self-government.’” (quoting 
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974))).    
 6. Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at 
Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 465, 469–70 (1998) (“Tempered by respect for tribal 
sovereignty, growing concern for the civil rights of Native Americans led to enactment 
of the ICRA following several years of hearings by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights.  The primary sponsor of the ICRA legislation was Senator Sam 
Ervin of North Carolina, who had concluded that the rights of Indians were ‘seriously 
jeopardized by the tribal government’s administration of justice,’ which he attributed 
to ‘tribal judges’ inexperience, lack of training, and unfamiliarity with the traditions 
and forms of the American legal system.’”). 
 7. 436 U.S. 49 (1977). 
 8. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the 
Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109, 1133 (2004) (stating that some scholars 
“have claimed . . . that the Santa Clara Court did tribes a disservice in the long run by 
finding no private right of action in the ICRA, because the non-reviewability of tribal 
decisions has led to the piecemeal divestment of tribal jurisdiction over non-
Indians”). 
 9. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 59.   
 10. See id. at 59.  The ICRA’s equal protection guarantee can be found at 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2006). 
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Martinez was decided in 1978, just a few years after the U.S. Su-
preme Court had begun to strike down sex-based classifications under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment11 and only 
two years after the Court had adopted the intermediate scrutiny test 
for sex-based classifications alleged to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, which it still applies today.12  The Supreme Court’s official 
recognition that sex-based classifications are inherently suspect under 
the Constitution occurred about nine years after the very first federal 
ban on sex discrimination in 1967, which was in the form of an 
Executive Order.13 
Although U.S. federal policy prohibiting sex discrimination was 
still in its early stages when Martinez was decided, the outcry against 
the Martinez case by mainstream feminists and other advocates of 
individual rights was extensive and has been well-documented.14  In 
fact, feminist “discontent with the decision continues to fuel discourse 
about gender equality and whether tribal law should be force-fit into 
an external norm.”15  In contrast, proponents of the decision point to 
the important cultural values and traditions that the decision supports 
and protects.16  Additionally, some Native scholars and commentators 
argue that sex-based oppression in tribal cultures derives from 
 
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within 
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 
(1971) (holding that an Idaho statute preferring males to administer estates violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 12. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), represents the Court’s first application 
of the intermediate scrutiny standard for sex-based classifications.  See, e.g., Brian 
Johnson, Admitting that Women’s Only Public Education is Unconstitutional and Advancing 
the Equality of the Sexes, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 53, 62–63 (2002) (describing Craig v. 
Boren and other early cases).  The standard was applied most recently by the Supreme 
Court in Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 13. See, e.g., Rebecca A. Kiselewich, Note, In Defense of the 2006 Title IX Regulations 
for Single-Sex Public Education: How Separate Can Be Equal, 49 B.C. L. REV. 217, 221 
(2008) (“[O]n October 13, 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson amended his 
Executive Order No. 11,246 to include the first prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of sex.”).  
 14. See, e.g., Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-Five 
Years of Disparate Cultural Visions: An Essay Introducing the Case for Reargument Before the 
American Indian Nations Supreme Court, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 50, 53–54 (2004); 
see generally Catharine A. MacKinnon, Whose Culture?  A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa 
Clara Pueblo (1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE & LAW 63–69 
(1987). 
 15. Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 53. 
 16. Id. at 54–57; see generally Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 (2004) (discussing how the Martinez decision acknowledged 
a way of life which traditionally honored nurturing and feminine qualities). 
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Western colonial influences17 and that it stems from the hierarchical 
nature of Western society and its valuing of all opposites as good or 
bad.18  Indeed, it appears that, in Santa Clara society, gender was 
traditionally—and to some extent still is—a mutable concept.19 
Rather than further exploring this dichotomy between those who 
bemoan the decision and those who applaud it, however, this article 
examines how tribal laws approach sex-based categorizations, 
particularly focusing on tribal prohibitions of sex discrimination.  
 
 17. ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 
18, 139 (2005) (describing Native societies in the colonial period as “more . . . 
egalitarian” than those of the colonizers, noting that “[i]n contrast to the deeply 
patriarchal nature of European societies, prior to colonization, Indian societies for 
the most part were not male-dominated,” and arguing that “[i]t has been through 
sexual violence and through the imposition of European gender relationships on 
Native communities that Europeans were able to colonize Native peoples in the first 
place”); Swentzell, supra note 16, at 99, 101 (suggesting that the sex-based member-
ship provision at Santa Clara Pueblo resulted from non-Indian attorneys’ drafting the 
Tribe’s constitution and describing sex-based oppression generally as a concept that 
was foreign to the traditional Santa Clara worldview); accord Madhavi Sunder, Piercing 
the Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1430 n.158, 1463 n.324 (2003) (describing how Canada’s 
Indian Act imposed patriarchal membership criteria on matrilineal indigenous 
cultures). 
 18. Swentzell, supra note 16, at 98, 101; see also SMITH, supra note 17, at 18 
(stating that, in Indian societies prior to colonization, “[a]lthough there existed a 
division of labor between women and men, women’s labor and men’s labor was 
accorded similar status”). 
 19. Swentzell, supra note 16, at 98.  As Ms. Swentzell explains: 
  At Santa Clara Pueblo, the social order was not traditionally either/or, 
not matriarchical or patriarchical. It was both. Even today, every child is 
born as a Winter person or a Summer person with the option to become the 
other if the sensibilities are of the other. To know and acknowledge both is 
encouraged, because ultimately, the goal is to embrace the whole . . . .  It is 
believed that every person has feminine and masculine, warm and cold, 
dark and light qualities. And, living is about acknowledging the other, the 
opposite, and balancing those forces within us and within our human socie-
ty . . . .  At Santa Clara, the ideal person was and still is the gia.  Earth, who 
gave the people birth is called gia, so is the biological woman who gives 
birth, and so are the community women who nurture and take care of many 
extended families. They give ceremonial or political advice, physical shelter 
and food, if needed, and housing. Most unusual is that men in the commu-
nity who behave as nurturing, embracing people in the political and cere-
monial realms are also called, gias, that is, mothers. The best way to behave 
in that world is as a mother . . . . 
Id.  For a discussion of another tribe’s view of gender as a mutable concept, see WILL 
ROSCOE, THE ZUNI MAN-WOMAN 22 (1st ed. 1991) (“While the traditional roles of men 
and women were well-defined, the Zunis viewed gender as an acquired rather than an 
inborn trait.  Biological sex did not dictate the roles individuals assumed.”). 
6
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Scant scholarly attention has been devoted to analysis of tribal law,20 
and this lack of analysis undoubtedly contributes to federal courts’ 
and other outsiders’ misconceptions and prejudice with respect to 
tribal systems of governance and tribal laws.21  Indeed, the outcry 
against Martinez can be understood as part of a widespread mistrust of 
tribal justice systems generally.22 
Thus, this article attempts to begin to set the record straight 
about tribal laws in the specific area of sex discrimination.  Tribal laws 
prohibiting sex discrimination (and those few tribal laws providing for 
sex-based distinctions) illuminate the diverse approaches that tribes 
take toward the concept of sex-based equal protection and sex 
discrimination.23  Accordingly, this article undertakes a broad-based 
survey of tribal laws that pertain to sex-based classifications.   
C. Organization of the Article 
The most important part of this article, Part II, contains the sur-
vey of tribal sex discrimination laws.  The survey begins with broader 
laws and proceeds to more specific or narrower laws.  A second, 
subsidiary organizing principle within this framework is the number 
 
 20. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, American Indian Law Codes: 
Pragmatic Law & Tribal Identity, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 29, 30 (2008). 
 21. See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 6, at 468, 485–89 (examining federal Indian 
policy developed through acts of Congress and judicial decisions from 1960 to the 
present day). 
 22. See, e.g., Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis:  One Year in the Life of Twenty 
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 285–87 (1998) (describing the 
incorrect general mistrust of tribal justice systems by the public and the Federal 
Government); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court’s Legal Culture War 
Against Tribal Law, 2 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 106 (2006) (describing 
Justice Souter’s concern that tribal law is “‘unusually difficult for an outsider to sort 
out’” and his implicit belief that “substantive tribal law is unknown and even 
unknowable by outsiders”) (quoting Nevada v. Hicks, 553 U.S. 333, 384–85 (2001) 
(Souter, J., concurring)); Ann E. Tweedy, Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, 
the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v. Lara:  Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next 
Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 651, 685–86, n.163 
(2009) (describing how prejudice against tribal courts both drives and results from 
judicial divestment of tribal sovereignty).  
 23. Tribes take diverse approaches to their ICRA obligations based on tribal 
needs, values, customs, and traditions; accordingly, ICRA-based rights under tribal law 
do not necessarily mirror the corresponding protections under federal law.  Mark D. 
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Tribal Courts 
& the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 487 (2000).  Additionally, of 
course, tribal guarantees of equality and tribal prohibitions on sex discrimination that 
are not related to the ICRA may well be interpreted differently than would similar 
provisions under federal law.  See id. at 487–89. 
7
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of tribes that have enacted a given type of law.  Thus, a specific type of 
broad law (e.g., employment discrimination) that has been enacted by 
five tribes would be examined before another type of equally broad 
law that has been enacted by only one tribe (e.g., public accommoda-
tions).  Equal protection guarantees, the broadest type of law 
examined here, are addressed first. 
Part II first examines equal protection guarantees and similar 
provisions,24 paying close attention to the limited tribal court case law 
interpreting equal protection guarantees in the context of sex 
discrimination claims.25  Secondly, this Part examines explicit steps 
tribes have taken to protect those within their jurisdictions from sex 
discrimination.  These protections range from the Navajo Nation’s 
broad-based protection in Title 1, section 3 of the Navajo Nation Bill 
of Rights,26 which exceeds the protections available under existing 
federal law27 and which has been interpreted by Navajo Courts to 
 
 24. Many tribes include an equal protection guarantee in their constitutions.  
See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, ART. VI, § 3(b)(11), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm;  CONSTITUTION 
OF THE SAC & FOX NATION, ART. X, § 8, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/sac_fox_const.htm; CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE SAULT STE. 
MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, ART. VIII, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/sault_chippewa_constandbylaws.htm.  Such constitutional 
guarantees may pre-date the ICRA and thus may be unrelated to it.  See Cooter & 
Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 31 (noting that some tribal governments enacted tribal 
constitutions immediately after passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).  At 
least some of these pre-ICRA constitutions included some form of an equal protection 
guarantee.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL 
COMMUNITY, art. VII, § 2 (preserving “equal economic opportunities” for all 
members), available at http://www.swinomish.org/departments/tribal_attorney/
tribal_code/pretitle%201/ constitutionbylaws.pdf.  This section was included in the 
original constitution passed in 1935.  See id. (documenting legislative history).  
Additionally, even equal protection guarantees that came into effect after the ICRA 
may not be related to the ICRA, and a lack of detailed legislative history often makes 
it impossible to tell. 
 25. Although the published tribal court cases construing the ICRA are by no 
means numerous, for example, see McCarthy, supra note 6, at 491, a few such cases 
are available that address sex discrimination claims.  Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. 
Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 
6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998); Griffith v. Wilkie, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6058 
(Northern Plains Intertribal Ct. App. 1991); see also Rosen, supra note 23, at 541 
(discussing the Winnebago Supreme Court’s opinion in Bigfire as well as two earlier 
Winnebago equal protection cases relating to sex discrimination).  
 26. NAVAJO NATION BILL OF RIGHTS tit. 1, § 3 (2008) (“Equality of rights under 
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex 
. . . .”). 
 27. See Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1138 (discussing how the Navajo Nation has 
8
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protect both men and women,28 to the more common, context-
specific code protections such as section 95-13(c) of the Eastern Band 
of Cherokee Indians’ Wages/Employment Rights Code, which 
provides that “[n]o covered employer shall discriminate against any 
employee on the basis of gender.”29  Tribal court case law that 
interprets specific code or policy provisions, or bars sex discrimina-
tion as a matter of common law, is also examined. 
Part III briefly analyzes the identified tribal laws that create sex-
based distinctions.  Part IV looks at the impact of tribal sovereign 
immunity laws on the enforceability of protections against sex 
discrimination.  Part V addresses the possibility that potential sex 
discrimination plaintiffs may be pursuing other avenues of relief in 
tribal courts and tribal agencies.  Finally, Part VI concludes that a 
significant percentage of tribes appear to have adopted laws or 
policies prohibiting sex discrimination.   
The goal of this survey of existing tribal protections against sex 
discrimination is to illuminate the positive, and often innovative, steps 
that tribes have taken to eliminate sex discrimination within their 
jurisdictions, while remaining realistic about the fact that such 
protections are not available in the case of every tribe.30  Given the 
inherent difficulty of researching tribal law,31 it is hoped that this 
article will serve as a useful starting point for practitioners, scholars, 
and state and federal court personnel seeking to understand tribal 
approaches toward sex discrimination. 
 
enacted laws that protect individual rights and liberties, some of which exceed the 
protections in the U.S. Constitution). 
 28. See Help v. Silvers a.k.a. Silver Fox, No. A-CV-01-82, ¶¶ 31–34 (Navajo May 6, 
1983) (holding that the proper analysis of the Navajo Equal Rights guarantee is that 
there can be no legal result on account of a person’s sex), available at 
http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/ 1983.NANN.0000001.htm. 
 29. CHEROKEE CODE art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder/ eccodetoc.htm.  These context-specific protections can 
be found in a wide range of subject areas where explicit protections would not 
typically be found under federal or state law.  See, e.g., SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX 
TRIBE CODE, ch. 31, § 31-01-01, available at http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/
sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw31.htm (prohibiting disparate treatment of prisoners 
based on sex and other grounds). 
 30. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 50, 59 (noting that the enrollment 
ordinance at issue in Santa Clara Pueblo is still in place, but explaining that the 
ordinance serves important tribal interests).   
 31. See, e.g., Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 32–35 (describing the 
research process and the difficulty in studying various tribal codes, including the 
idiosyncrasies present in some tribes’ recording methods). 
9
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D. Methodology 
The sources relied on include the tribal codes, constitutions, and 
cases available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource 
Center, cases included in the Indian Law Reporter from 1983 through 
early 2008,32 the University of Washington’s 1988 microfiche compila-
tion of tribal codes and constitutions, the decisions of the Northwest 
Intertribal Courts, the limited tribal law resources available on 
Westlaw, and, occasionally, legal resources downloaded from the 
websites of individual tribes and obtained from other miscellaneous 
sources.   
Researching tribal law is inherently difficult, and it is literally im-
possible without visiting each tribe’s reservation to ensure that one 
has the most recent and comprehensive set of tribal laws available 
from each tribe.33  While tribal cases are generally more difficult to 
obtain than tribal codes,34 which are equivalent to tribal statutory law, 
obtaining a complete version of either source from a given tribe is 
likely to be somewhat difficult because “tribal officials seldom 
circulate their laws outside the reservation and tribal judges seldom 
document their decisions in writings that outsiders can access.”35  
Indeed, in most cases, the particular sources I relied on did not 
purport to be comprehensive even as to the tribes whose laws were 
included.  For example, the Indian Law Reporter, which exists solely 
in hard copy format, is the “only national reporter of tribal court 
decisions.”36  However, it does not publish all of the tribal court 
decisions submitted to it, typically publishing about “one hundred 
decisions per year that come from about twenty-five tribes.”37  
 
 32. 1983 was the first year that the Indian Law Reporter included tribal court 
decisions.  David A. Castleman, Personal Jurisdiction in Tribal Courts, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
1253, 1254 (2006). 
 33. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 32–34 (explaining the difficulty of 
researching tribal law).   
 34. See The Honorable Korey Wahwassuck, The New Face of Tribal Justice: Joint 
Tribal-State Jurisdiction, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 733, 739 (2008) (“[R]elatively few tribal 
courts keep records of their proceedings, and of those that do, even fewer publish 
those opinions in the Indian Law Reporter”); Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 
34–35. 
 35. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 31. 
 36. Frank Pommersheim, Looking Forward and Looking Back: The Promise and 
Potential of a Sioux Nation Judicial Support Center and Sioux Nation Supreme Court, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 269, 275 (2002).  
 37. Rosen, supra note 23, at 510; accord Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 35 
(describing the Indian Law Reporter as “collect[ing] a small number of cases from 
10
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Moreover, some of the Indian Law Reporter volumes I used have 
missing pages, and the Indian Law Reporter also has irregular 
indexing over time, which made it difficult to ensure consistency.   
Similarly, the 1988 microfiche compilation contains codes and 
constitutions from only fifty-six tribes and is not only now out-of-date, 
but is also incomplete even with respect to the tribes who are 
represented.38  Additionally, visual searching of microfiche tends to be 
an inexact science, and my search of the microfiche was primarily 
limited to provisions explicitly mentioning “sex” or “gender.”  
Finally, the National Tribal Justice Resource Center does not guaran-
tee that its sources are up-to-date or comprehensive with respect to 
the tribes that are included,39 and I identified a couple of instances in 
which codes or constitutional provisions provided on the site were in 
fact not currently in place.40  Thus, because of the virtual impossibility 
of conducting an all-inclusive survey, this article provides a snapshot 
of numerous tribal approaches to sex as a classification in the hopes 
of facilitating greater understanding of the diverse ways that tribes 
approach the issue of sex discrimination and the significant protec-
tions that many tribes afford against it.  
The most comprehensive portion of this survey was my search of 
the online tribal codes and constitutions available on the National 
Tribal Justice Resource Center site.  On that site, I examined all the 
hits for the following terms: “sex,” “gender,” “equal protection” 
(with quotes), “male,” “female,” “father,” “mother,” “sexual 
harassment” (with quotes), and “sexually harass” (without quotes).  
During the period of my searches in August 2008, the National Tribal 
Justice Resource Center webpage stated that it had archived on its site 
the codes and resolutions of 69 tribes41 and the constitutions and 
bylaws of 116 tribes.42  Despite the potential incompleteness of this 
 
reservations throughout the United States”). 
 38. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 33. 
 39. See id. (noting that online collections, such as that of the National Tribal 
Justice Resource Center, are not yet “close to complete” and that “[t]o gain access to 
a complete set of codes for a tribe, one must go to reservations and speak to 
officials”). 
 40. See infra notes 45 and 102. 
 41. See National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Directory of Tribal Codes and 
Tribal Resolutions, http://www.ntjrc.org/triballaw/codesdirectory.asp (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2008). 
 42. See National Tribal Justice Resource Center, Directory of Tribal Constitutions 
and By-Laws, http://www.ntjrc.org/triballaw/constdirectory.asp (last visited Aug. 18, 
2008). 
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resource, the percentages of tribes that had particular types of sex 
discrimination laws in place are provided, usually in the footnotes to 
the discussions of such laws.  
In fall 2008, additional tribal law resources became available on 
Westlaw (although still of very limited scope).  Thus, in late January 
and in February 2009, I ran the following search in the Westlaw Tribal 
Cases and the Tribal Codes and Indexes databases: “sex gender ‘equal 
protection’ male female father mother ‘sexual harassment’ ‘sexually 
harass.’”  During this time period, Westlaw had cases from ten tribes 
online as well as a somewhat overlapping database of Oklahoma tribal 
decisions.  Additionally, it had the tribal codes of two tribes, the 
Navajo Nation and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, in its tribal codes 
database.  In many instances, materials found through Westlaw had 
already been identified through earlier searches of other resources.  
However, any newly discovered sex discrimination materials were 
added to the article at that point.  
II. TRIBAL SEX DISCRIMINATION LAWS 
At the outset it should be noted that whether or not a tribal code 
or constitution protects against sex discrimination is not determina-
tive of whether its tribal court would recognize such a claim.  Even in 
the absence of a code provision or constitutional provision that 
prohibits sex discrimination, either explicitly or implicitly, a tribal 
court may hold such conduct to be actionable as a matter of common 
law.43  
 
 43. See, e.g., Michael Taylor, Modern Practice in Indian Courts, 10 U. PUGET SOUND 
L. REV. 231, 239 (1986–87) (“The lack of a code provision in a specific area does not 
mean that the tribal court may not exercise inherent jurisdiction in that area of the 
law.”); see also Bank of Hoven v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., No. 03-002-A/R-120-
99, slip op. at 6–9 (Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal App. Ct., Nov. 24, 2004), available at 
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/tribal-coa-opinion-bank-of-hoven.pdf 
(recognizing a race discrimination claim under tribal common law), aff’d, Plains 
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 440 F. Supp. 2d 1070 (D.S.D. 
2006), aff’d, 491 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008); 
Hoopa Forest Industries v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 & n.1 (Hoopa Valley 
Tribal Ct. 1998) (reversing a tribal agency’s determination that the employer was 
liable for sexual harassment based upon the facts that the agency had not entered 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that the agency had relied on an exhibit that 
was not in the record, and that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of severity 
required under federal standards, which the court appeared to be using in an 
advisory capacity despite the statement in tribal personnel policies that only an 
individual harasser could be held liable for sexual harassment). 
12
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A. Equal Protection and Related Guarantees 
Numerous tribal laws provide equal protection guarantees that, 
like the language in the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, generally provide that the tribe “will not deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws.”44  Many such 
laws are part of tribal constitutions45 while others have been enacted 
 
 44. CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, art. XI, § 8, microformed on 
Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson 
ed. 1988). 
 45. CONSTITUTION OF THE CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, art. 16, § 1(h), available  
at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/potawatomi_nation_const.htm; 
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF THE COLORADO 
RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA, art. III, § 3, microformed on Indian 
Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 
1988); CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, art. VI, § 3(b)(11), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm; CROW TRIBAL 
CONSTITUTION, art. XI, § 4(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter .org/
ccfolder1/crow_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE DUCKWATER SHOSHONE TRIBE OF THE 
DUCKWATER RESERVATION, NEVADA, art. IV, § 2(h), available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/duckwater_shoshone_const.htm; CONSTITUTION 
& BYLAWS OF THE ELY SHOSHONE TRIBE, art. VIII, §§ 1, 2(h), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ely_shoshone_const.htm; CONSTI-
TUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF 
OREGON, art. III, § 3(k), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
grand_ronde_constandbylaws.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF 
OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. X, § 1(h), available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/grand_traverse_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE 
HO-CHUNK NATION, art. X, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/hochunk_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE TRIBE OF 
HUSLIA, ALASKA, art. 12, § 3(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/huslia_al_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE KICKAPOO TRADITIONAL 
TRIBE OF TEXAS, art. X, § 2(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/kickapoo_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE NATIVE TRIBE OF KOYUKUK, 
ALASKA, art. 11, § 3(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
koyukuk_al_const.htm; LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS CONSTITUTION, art. III, 
§ 1(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/little_river_
const.htm; REVISED CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE, art. 
XIII, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constand
bylaws.htm; CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, 
art. X, § 1(h), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/mississippi_
choctaw_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE SIPAYIK MEMBERS OF THE PASAMAQUODDY 
TRIBE, art. IV, § 1(h), available at http://www.wabanaki.com/tribal_constitution.htm; 
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE ROSEBUD SIOUX TRIBE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, art. X, § 3, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/rosebudconst.htm; CON-
STITUTION OF THE SAC & FOX NATION, art. X, § 8, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sac_fox_const.htm; SALISH & KOOTENAI CONSTITUTION 
& BYLAWS CODIFIED, app., available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
salishandkootenai_constandbylaws.htm (explicitly incorporating and setting forth the 
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as part of the tribal code.46  Still other tribes have enacted equal 
 
text of the ICRA, including its equal protection guarantee); CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS 
OF THE SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. VIII, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_chippewa_constandbylaws.htm; 
CONSTITUTION OF THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE [AND RELATED DOCUMENTS], art. IX, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/skokomish_const.htm; 
SAINT REGIS MOHAWK TRIBE CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 1(h), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/saint_regis_mohawk_const.htm; 
CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE, art. XI, § 8 microformed on Indian 
Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 
1988); CONSTITUTION OF THE TORRES MARTINEZ DESERT CAHUILLA INDIANS TORRES 
MARTINEZ RESERVATION, CALIFORNIA, art. V, § 1(H), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/torresconst.htm; CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE 
TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. XIV, § 3, available at 
http://www.tmbci.net/PDF/Constitution.pdf (judiciary to ensure “equal 
protection”); CONSTITUTION OF THE WAMPANOAG TRIBE OF GAY HEAD (AQUINNAH), art. 
III, § 1(d), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/wampanoag_
const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE YAVAPAI-APACHE NATION, art. IX, § (h), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_apache_const.html; CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI NATION, art. VIII, § 1(H), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_ftmcdowell_const.htm. 
  Thus, roughly twenty percent of the tribal constitutions available on the 
National Tribal Justice Resource Center site had equal protection clauses.  See supra 
Part I.E. (explaining that 116 tribal constitutions and bylaws were archived on the 
National Tribal Justice Resource Center site during the relevant period).  Note that 
the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ constitution was available online on 
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center website but that another of that Tribe’s 
documents downloaded from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center appeared 
to be out-of-date, so I downloaded the constitution from the Tribe’s own website to 
ensure I had the most current version.  See infra note 102.  Because the Turtle 
Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ Constitution was available on the National 
Tribal Justice Resource Center website, I included it in the count of tribal constitu-
tions available from that website and also included its equal protection clause in the 
calculation of the number of tribes having such clauses.  Similarly, the Pasamaquoddy 
Constitution was designated a draft on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center 
site, so I downloaded the version from that tribe’s own website.  Likewise, the Hopi 
Constitution on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center site has both an equal 
protection clause and an explicit, broad-based prohibition on sex-discrimination, 
CONSTITUTION OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1(i), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/hopi_const.htm, but it appears to be 
an unapproved draft, based on information communicated by the Hopi Tribal 
Secretary’s Office.  Personal Communication with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office 
(Oct. 1, 2008); see also CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1 (1993), 
available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=50&
group=13.  Therefore, the Hopi provision from the Tribal Justice Resource Center 
was not counted, although the Pasamaquoddy Tribe’s Constitution was counted.   
 46. See Colville Tribal Civil Rights Act, ch.1–5, § 1-5-2(h), available at http://
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/colville_lawandorder_CHPT1-5.html; CON-
FEDERATED TRIBES OF THE COOS, LOWER UMPQUA AND SIUSLAW INDIANS TRIBAL CODE, tit. 
I, ch. 1–5, § 1-5-1(g), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
coos_umpqua_siuslaw_tribalcode_1_5.htm; MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS, tit. 
14
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protection guarantees, or other guarantees of equality, that apply in 
specialized circumstances.47  These context-specific protections may 
be in addition to general equal protection guarantees48 or they may 
stand alone.49  Finally, some tribes have expressly adopted the 
 
XX, ch. 1, § 1(a)(8), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder/
masht20.htm; STATUTES OF THE NON-REMOVABLE MILLE LACS BAND OF CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS, BAND STATUTE 1011-MCL-5, § 8; SISSETON, S.D., ORDINANCE No.79-02 (1979), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_
codeoflaw20.htm (stating that judiciary of the tribe is to provide “equal protection 
and justice” pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act). 
 47. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF 
THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA, art. III, § 3, 
microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes 
(Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (providing for “equal political rights and equal 
opportunity to participate in the economic resources and activities of the tribes” in 
addition to equal protection); NISQUALLY TRIBAL CODE, tit. 38, § 38-01-03, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/nisqcode38.htm (“no person shall 
be denied the equal protection of the terms of” the sub-chapter pertaining to tobacco 
revenue taxation); CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE SILETZ INDIANS, OR., STANDING COM-
MITTEE ORDINANCE 84-06, § 4 (1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/silcode6standcommord.htm (“Committee Members may also be 
removed for cause following a hearing before the Tribal Council, which provides 
applicable standards of due process and equal protection.”); id. § 12 (“The Tribal 
Chairman shall attempt to ensure that all members of the Siletz Tribe have an equal 
opportunity to serve on committees . . . .”); CONSTITUTION OF THE WAMPANOAG TRIBE 
OF GAY HEAD (AQUINNAH), art. III, § 3(b), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/wampanoag_const.htm (requiring the Tribal Council to “[e]nsure 
that tribal members have free access to the clay in the cliffs on an equal basis 
provided that such access is subject to reasonable regulation in order to protect and 
preserve the resource”). 
  Some of the guarantees that are phrased somewhat differently than an 
ordinary “equal protection” guarantee may in fact be just as broad as the concept of 
equal protection.  See, e.g., CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. IX, § 1 
(1993), available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&
Itemid=50&group=13 (providing for “[a]ll resident members of the Tribe [to] . . . be 
given equal opportunities to share in the economic resources and activities of the 
jurisdiction”).  
 48. See, e.g., STANDING ROCK SIOUX CODE OF JUSTICE, tit. XVIII, ch. 1, § 18-102(c) 
(“compensation for work will be based on the principles of equal pay for equal 
work.”), microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law 
Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988); see also CONSTITUTION OF THE STANDING ROCK SIOUX 
TRIBE, art. XI, § 8, microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of 
Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (providing general Equal Protection 
guarantee). 
 49. For example, nothing in the Nisqually Tribe’s constitution or code, assuming 
the complete version is available on the National Tribal Justice Resource Center 
website, appears to provide for “equal protection” except for the provision relating to 
tobacco revenue taxation.  NISQUALLY TRIBAL CODE, tit. 38, § 38-01-03, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/nisqcode38.htm (“no person shall 
be denied the equal protection of the terms of” the sub-chapter pertaining to tobacco 
15
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provisions of the ICRA as a matter of tribal law, and, to the extent any 
of these tribes lack separate equal protection guarantees, they should 
be viewed to have such guarantees in place, based on the terms of the 
ICRA.50 
Without tribal court case law on point, however, it is difficult to 
know how a particular tribe would apply such equal protection 
guarantees in the context of a sex discrimination claim and whether, 
even if the tribal court followed the federal model of differing levels 
of scrutiny for different types of classifications, it would apply 
heightened scrutiny to a sex-based classification.51  This is because 
 
revenue taxation).  However, the Tribe’s constitution does provide for “[a]ll 
members of the Tribe . . . [to] be accorded equal opportunities to participate in the 
economic resources and activities of the Tribe.”  CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE 
NISQUALLY TRIBE OF THE NISQUALLY INDIAN RESERVATION, art. VII, § 2, available at 
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/nisqconst.htm. 
 50. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBE, art. VI, § 3(b)(11), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/coquille_const.htm 
(“The Tribal Council and other officials of the Tribe shall not deny to any person the 
equal protection of tribal laws . . . .  The Tribe shall provide to all persons within its 
jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”); 
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE 
COMMUNITY OF OREGON, art. III, §3(k), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/grand_ronde_constandbylaws.htm (“The Tribal 
Council shall not deny to any person the equal protection of tribal laws . . . . The 
Tribe shall provide to all persons within its jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”); SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO CODE, tit. XVIII, ch. 57, § 57-
3, available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/sicode/sanildcodet18consumer.htm#
chapter57 (“Any person who has probable cause to believe that his or her civil rights 
guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of April 11, 1968, PL 90-284 (82 Stat. 77) or 
by the traditions and customs of the Pueblo,  [sic] may file a complaint with the 
Tribal Court pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure set forth in this Code.”); SALISH 
& KOOTENAI CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS CODIFIED, APPENDIX, available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/salishandkootenai_constandbylaws.htm (explic-
itly incorporating and setting forth the text of the ICRA, including its equal 
protection guarantee); CONSTITUTION OF THE SKOKOMISH INDIAN TRIBE [AND RELATED 
DOCUMENTS], art. IX, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
skokomish_const.htm (“The tribal government shall not deny to any person the 
equal protection of tribal laws . . . .  The tribe shall provide to all persons within its 
jurisdiction the rights guaranteed by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.”); 
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS, art. 
XIV, § 3, available at http://www.tmbci.net/PDF/Constitution.pdf (judiciary to 
ensure “equal protection” and “protection of rights arising under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968, as amended”). 
 51. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 23, at 487–88, 511; Taylor, supra note 43, at 255–
57 (suggesting that this potential for diverse interpretations of rights based on tribal 
cultural norms furthers tribal sovereignty and allows individual tribal cultures to 
flourish and that forced standardization of rights would threaten the viability of tribal 
cultures as unique institutions); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Employment Separation: 
16
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tribal “needs, values, customs, and traditions” play an important role 
in tribal interpretation of civil rights guarantees,52 regardless of 
whether a litigant is proceeding under tribal law or the ICRA.53  
Therefore, especially with regard to a facially sex-neutral guarantee 
like “equal protection,” tribal court case law, where available, is an 
enormously important resource.54  
For most of the tribal laws cited above, I was unable to locate tri-
bal court case law construing the equal protection guarantee in the 
context of a sex discrimination case.  However, the Northern Plains 
Intertribal Court of Appeals has considered the scope of the ICRA’s 
equal protection guarantee in the context of a custody dispute, and 
that court invalidated a family law provision of the Turtle Mountain 
 
Tribal Law Enigma, Tribal Governance Paradox, and Tribal Court Conundrum, 38 MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 273, 273–74 (2005) (“External rules and interpretations . . . would 
destroy the unique traditional, cultural and community attributes of tribal communi-
ties . . . [and] would destroy the diversity that exists among the many tribal 
communities themselves.  The essence of sovereignty is the right of the people of a 
nation to decide what their body of jurisprudence shall be.”) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1153 (describing Navajo 
officials’ view that “sovereignty and [the] survival of the Navajo people” are linked 
and quoting Navajo Nation Legislative Counsel Raymond Etcitty’s complaint that 
tribes are not looked upon as “laboratories of democracy”). 
 52. Rosen, supra note 23, at 487; see also Colville Confederated Tribes v. Bearcub, 
35 Indian L. Rptr. 6011, 6012 (Confederated Tribes of the Colville Tribal Ct. 2005) 
(explaining tribe’s right to interpret free speech rights differently under the ICRA 
than a federal court would under the U.S. Constitution). 
 53. Rosen, supra note 23, at 511; Taylor, supra note 43, at 239, 255–56; see also 
Winnebego Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229, 6230 (Winnebago 
Sup. Ct. 1998); accord Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 
6232, 6235–36 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winneba-
go Sup. Ct. 1998); Fletcher, supra note 51, at 273–74.  However, the Winnebago 
Supreme Court in Bigfire suggested that its analysis of equal protection might be 
somewhat different under the ICRA than under the tribal constitution.  Bigfire, 25 
Indian L. Rptr. at 6230, 6233. 
 54. Although some scholars have suggested that tribal courts are much less likely 
to follow precedent than American courts, Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 59, 
my limited experience practicing before tribal courts in the Northwestern United 
States suggests that precedent from the particular tribal court deciding a case, where 
available, is immensely important and that tribal courts often look to opinions from 
other tribes as persuasive authority.  See also Taylor, supra note 43, at 240 (“Tribal 
courts will generally follow their own precedents and give considerable weight to the 
decisions of other Indian courts.”); accord Nevayaktewa v. Hopi Tribe, 
1998.NAHT.0000003, Nos. 97CR000931 and 97CR000932 ¶¶ 31–32 (App. Ct. of the 
Hopi Tribe, Mar. 20, 1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAHT.0000003.htm (considering whether defendants’ 
allegations meet the requirements of an equal protection test created by Burns Pauite 
Court of Appeals).   
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Tribal Code that severely limited the rights of an unmarried father.55  
By contrast, the Winnebago Tribal Court upheld a sex-neutral tribal 
criminal prohibition on sexual intercourse with an unemancipated 
minor against an as-applied challenge that was based on the equal 
protection guarantee in the tribal constitution, and its decision was 
affirmed by the Winnebago Supreme Court.56  The Tribal Court of the 
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians took some-
what of a middle ground, rejecting a former employee’s equal 
protection claim based on the court’s conclusion that the female 
plaintiff was not similarly situated to a male who had not been 
discharged three years before.57  Finally, the Mashantucket Pequot 
Tribal Court has suggested that sex discrimination is covered by its 
statutory equal protection clause, although it does not appear that a 
litigant has yet brought a successful sex discrimination claim under 
the clause.58 
1. The Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Appeals’ Decision 
Regarding the Application of ICRA’s Equal Protection Guarantee in 
the Context of the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians’ Law  
In Griffith v. Wilkie, the Northern Plains Intertribal Court of Ap-
 
 55. Griffith v. Wilkie, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6058, 6059 (Northern Plains Intertribal 
Ct. App. 1991). 
 56. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian 
L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998).  The Winnebago Tribal Court also decided 
three other cases dealing with similar issues, two of which were ultimately consolidat-
ed on appeal with Bigfire.  Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Frazier, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6021 
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Levering, 25 Indian L. 
Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Whitewater, 25 
Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); see also Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 
6229; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541. 
 57. Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Case No. 95-
067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 
July 20, 2001), slip op. at 3–4. 
 58. Barnes v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 4 Mashantucket Rptr. 477, 
485, 2007 WL 2728330 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2007) (rejecting the 
plaintiff’s argument, under the statutory equal protection clause, “that the Gaming 
Enterprise treats African American men differently than African American women” 
because the witness’ testimony did not support the claim, and concluding that 
plaintiff therefore “failed to make a prima facie showing of gender discrimination”); 
see also Sawyer v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 413, 2001 
WL 36037904 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Nov. 27, 2001) (granting dismissal of 
plaintiff’s claims for sex discrimination in employment because the claims accrued 
before passage of the law containing the equal protection guarantee and the law was 
not intended to be retroactive). 
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peals examined a provision of the Turtle Mountain Tribal Code that 
granted the “custody, services, and earnings” of an illegitimate child 
to the mother.59  The court had ordered, and considered supplemen-
tal briefing, on the issue of “the constitutionality” of the provision.60  
Without providing the details of its analysis on the issue, the court 
concluded that, “in situations where paternity is established or 
acknowledged,” the provision “denie[s the father] equal protection 
of the law” and therefore violates 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8).61  It thus 
remanded the case to the trial court to determine the best interests of 
the child.62   
Although Griffith appears to be a strong affirmation of the con-
cept of equal protection as construed in American culture, it is 
important to recognize the harshness of the law at issue, which 
accorded the mother of an illegitimate child custody as a matter of 
law.  Given the severity of the law, the case does not necessarily shed 
light on how the court would respond to a less drastic incursion on 
the unmarried father’s rights, such as a presumption in favor of 
maternal custody.  Moreover, perhaps also due to the harshness of the 
law, the court is not explicit about its methodology for evaluating 
equal protection questions.  Thus, these issues will most likely have to 
await a more difficult case for definitive resolution. 
2. The Winnebago Courts’ Construal of the Equal Protection 
Guarantee in the Tribal Constitution 
This subsection examines the trial court’s decision in Bigfire and 
that of the Winnebago Supreme Court.  The Winnebago courts’ 
decisions do not entirely reject traditional federal analysis and, in fact, 
incorporate some federal concepts like the requirement that a 
plaintiff show she was similarly situated to someone not in the 
protected class who was treated more favorably and also the concept 
of differing levels of scrutiny.  Nonetheless, the decisions reveal 
considerable discomfort with, and resistance to, the federal approach, 
at least in the context of a claim based on the tribal constitution.  
 
 59. Griffith, 18 Indian L. Rptr. at 6059. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 6059–60. 
19
Tweedy: Sex Discrimination under Tribal Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
2. Tweedy.docx 1/22/2010  3:13 PM 
2010] SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER TRIBAL LAW 411 
 
a. The Trial Court’s Decision Upholding the Law 
In Bigfire, the Winnebago Tribal Court upheld a facially neutral 
statutory rape law against the defendant’s allegation that prosecuting 
only the male under such a law violated the equal protection provi-
sion of the Tribe’s constitution.63  The trial court appeared dismissive 
of federal law, even as persuasive authority, and skeptical both of 
whether the federal three-tiered approach to equal protection analysis 
based on the type of classification at issue would serve the interests of 
the Winnebago Tribal Court and of whether intermediate scrutiny 
would be an appropriate standard for sex-based classifications.64  
Additionally, because the parties had not provided any information 
on traditional tribal approaches to rape, the court solicited its own 
expert information on the matter, and set forth in the opinion the 
substance of that information, which detailed violent disfigurement as 
a punishment for a wife’s unfaithfulness and the punishment of death 
for a man’s rape of a female aged thirteen or above.65   
 
 63. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska. v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232, 6236, 6239 
(Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago Sup. Ct. 
1998).  Other tribal court decisions had gone the other way but were either overruled 
or reversed by the tribal supreme court.  See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Frazier, 
25 Indian L. Rptr. 6021 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska 
v. Levering, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); Winnebago Tribe 
of Nebraska v. Whitewater, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6022 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997); see 
also Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6229; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541. 
 64. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6238–39.  This somewhat dismissive attitude 
toward federal law does not appear to be typical of tribal courts, most of which, in the 
absence of precedent from their own courts, appear to seriously consider both the 
parameters of the right at issue under federal law and whether it is appropriate to 
follow federal law in construing the right.  See, e.g., Nevayaktewa v. Hopi Tribe, 
1998.NAHT.0000003, Nos. 97CR000931 and 97CR000932 ¶¶ 28–32 (App. Ct. of the 
Hopi Tribe, March 20, 1998), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
opinions/opfolder/1998.NAHT.0000003.htm.  Indeed, Matthew Fletcher has studied 
ICRA cases and determined that there is a high probability that a tribal court will use 
federal and state law as persuasive authority when construing the ICRA, especially in 
cases involving nonmembers.  Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal Courts, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, and Customary Law: Preliminary Data 16, 20 (MSU Legal Studies Research 
Paper, No. 06-05, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103474.   
 65. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6239.  Such harsh traditional punishments are 
also part of the historical fabric of Western culture.  See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 17, at 
18 (explaining that “because English women were not allowed to express political 
opinions, a woman who spoke out against taxation in 1664 was condemned to having 
her tongue nailed to a tree near a highway, with a paper fastened to her back 
detailing her offense”); see also A COLLECTION OF ALL THE ACTS OF ASSEMBLY, NOW IN 
FORCE, IN THE COLONY OF VIRGINIA 339–40 (1733) (providing that “where any such 
Negro, Mullatto, or Indian, shall, upon due Proof made . . . be found to have given a 
20
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In rejecting the defendant’s challenge to the law, the trial court 
did not officially reject intermediate scrutiny or rely on the traditional 
punishments.66  Rather, having determined that it was premature to 
make decisions on those issues, the trial court rejected the defen-
dant’s arguments because it determined, in essence, that he was not 
similarly situated to the female victim.67  The court referred to the 
“ample evidence that force or coercion was present,” the fact that the 
statute was facially neutral or “benign,” the fact that the defendant 
had failed to provide evidence that the law was being applied in a 
discriminatory fashion, and finally, possibly based on the evidence of 
force or coercion, the fact that “consent was not an issue” in this 
case.68  Thus, in rejecting the defendant’s challenge, the trial court 
concluded that “there seems to be little gained and huge detriments 
both psychologically and in law enforcement in charging victims of 
violent sexual assault with criminal sanctions.”69 Most likely, the fact 
that the victim was twelve at the time of the attack while the perpetra-
tor was seventeen-and-a-half also played a part in the court’s deci-
sion.70   
b. The Winnebago Supreme Court’s Decision 
This opinion was later affirmed by the Winnebago Supreme 
Court.  In that case, the court heard two consolidated appeals, that of 
Mr. Bigfire and that of C.L., a fifteen-year-old male, who was charged 
with second-degree sexual assault (i.e., statutory rape) of a thirteen-
year-old girl; a third appeal had been dismissed on double jeopardy 
grounds.71  The Winnebago Supreme Court adopted a strict scrutiny 
test for sex but determined that the compelling tribal interest 
 
false Testimony, every such offender shall, without further Trial, be ordered by the 
said Court to have one Ear nailed to the Pillory, and there to stand for the Space of 
one Hour, and then the said Ear to be cut off; and thereafter, the other Ear nailed in 
like Manner, and cut off, at the expiration of one other Hour; and moreover, to order 
every such Offender Thirty-Nine Lashes, well laid on, on his or her bare Back, at the 
common Whipping-Post”).  However, it is somewhat surprising and even disturbing, 
at least from a Western perspective, to see such harsh punishments explicitly set forth 
as a possible source of authority for a current decision.   
 66. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6238–39. 
 67. Id. at 6239. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 6233. 
 71. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229, 6229 
(Winnebago Sup. Ct. 1998). 
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requirement was satisfied in the case because traditional cultural 
differentiations based on sex always constitute a compelling tribal 
interest.72  The court considered “whether the use of different roles 
based on gender, particularly in areas of sex and procreation, is of a 
similar discriminatory and patriarchal nature [as in Anglo culture] 
when employed within the Winnebago Tribe.”73  The court concluded 
that, “[i]n Ho-Chunk [or Winnebago] culture . . . gender differences 
or disparities in treatment do not signal hierarchy, lack of respect or 
invidious discrimination,” and therefore, held that “it is not accurate 
to attribute archaic stereotypes of the Anglo-American culture to the 
Winnebago Tribe’s culture.”74  This conclusion was supported in part 
by the statement of one of the judges deciding the case, a woman who 
was a member of a related tribe; she explained that she had  “no . . . 
feeling of inequality . . .” as a result of tribal differentiations in sex 
roles.75 
The Winnebago Supreme Court’s decision has been considered 
troubling to some scholars because of the court’s indication that 
culture would always trump the guarantee of equal protection.76  
However, the court also emphasized the age differences between the 
perpetrators and the victims in the cases and the fact that there were 
only three prosecutions, a number that was too small, in the court’s 
view, to demonstrate a pattern of sex discrimination.77  Furthermore, 
the court appeared to place importance on the fact that it was not 
construing the ICRA but rather the tribal constitution.78  Additionally, 
the court recognized that the result in the case, namely the Winneba-
go Supreme Court’s decision to uphold this sex-neutral statutory rape 
law against a selective enforcement challenge, is not at variance with 
federal law, given that the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld a sex-based 
statutory rape law based on its conclusion that young women and men 
are not similarly situated with respect to pregnancy.79  Also, reading 
 
 72. Id. at 6231; Rosen, supra note 23, at 541–44 (citing Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 
at 6229). This was not a traditional federal-style strict scrutiny analysis because the 
court did not look at whether the governmental action was narrowly tailored to the 
compelling tribal interest.  See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 
551 U.S. 449, 464–65 (2007). 
 73. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6232. 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. at 6233. 
 76. Rosen, supra note 23, at 543–44. 
 77. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6231. 
 78. Id. at 6230, 6233.  
 79. Michael M. v. Super. Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 467 (1981); Bigfire, 
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the lower court opinion in Bigfire demonstrates the weakness of the 
defendant’s equal protection challenge considering the circumstances 
of the case and the injustice that would evidently occur if the crime of 
forcible rape of a twelve-year-old girl were to go unpunished.80  
Finally, the Winnebago Supreme Court indicated that, if sex-based 
prosecutions continued, it might begin to strike them down as 
violative of the sex-neutral statute; thus, it saw the statute as overrid-
ing, at least to some extent, traditional tribal customs.81 
In both the Winnebago Supreme Court’s discussion of the fact 
that it was construing the tribal constitution rather than the ICRA and 
its intimation that it might hold that future prosecutions, if shown to 
be sex-based, violate the sex-neutral statute, the court evidenced a 
desire to protect the uniqueness of Winnebago law, especially as 
embodied in the tribal constitution, from being subsumed by federal 
law.82  For instance, in the discussion preceding its conclusion that the 
“Ho-Chunk tradition and customary law certainly was not rendered 
illegal by the Tribe’s own constitution,”83 the court explained: 
Since the legal concept of equal protection . . . is an Anglo-
American legal concept, this Court must look in part to the 
current American legal tradition . . . .  But this analysis must 
stop short of simply applying another standard to a different 
cultural system with a unique legal tradition without adjust-
ments for or taking any account of that which is unique in 
that system.84 
The court also noted that the sex-neutral statutory rape statute 
showed that the “Tribal Council plainly adopted a current tribal 
policy of furthering gender neutrality in this area as much as possi-
ble,”85 and it distinguished this current tribal policy from the more 
 
25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6233. 
 80. See generally Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Bigfire, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6232, 
6236, 6239 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. 1997), aff’d 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6229 (Winnebago 
Sup. Ct. 1998).  Although the defendant objected on appeal to the trial court’s 
conclusion that force or coercion had been at play, the evidence of force to which the 
lower court alluded may still have had an emotional effect on the appellate judges. 
Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6229.  Note that the trial court did not hear the 
substantive issues in the case involving the other defendant, C.L., because his pre-trial 
motion to dismiss had been granted.  Id.  A third defendant had been acquitted after 
trial, so retrial was barred by double jeopardy.  Id. at 6229, 6234. 
 81. Bigfire, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6233–34. 
 82. Id. at 6233–34. 
 83. Id. at 6233. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
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permanent equal protection guarantee of the tribal constitution, 
which, in the court’s view, did not mandate treating both sexes the 
same.86  Thus, the Winnebago Supreme Court’s decision in Bigfire 
should be read in part as an attempt to preserve the uniqueness of 
tribal custom and tradition against the threat of wholesale incorpora-
tion of federal ideas.  At the same time, however, the court showed 
that it was willing to enforce federal legal constructs such as gender 
neutrality if it could be demonstrated both that they had been 
adopted as law by the Tribal Council and that they were being violated 
by the tribal prosecutor.  Thus, it could be said that the Winnebago 
Supreme Court in Bigfire simply adopted a presumption against 
construing tribal constitutional provisions identically to the way 
similar provisions would be interpreted in a federal court but that, 
outside of the context of the tribal constitution, for example in 
construing the ICRA or a law adopted by the Tribal Council, the court 
may well be more open to federal analysis.  
3. The Decision of the Tribal Court in Koon v. Grand Traverse 
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 
In Koon, a tribal conservation officer who had been dismissed 
from employment after she was convicted of drunk driving brought 
suit alleging violation of the tribal constitution’s equal protection 
guarantee.87  The basis of her claim was that a male employee was not 
dismissed for a similar incident three years before.88  The court, 
however, accepted the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff was not 
similarly situated to this male employee because, although both 
plaintiff’s job and that of the male employee involved driving, it had 
become much more difficult to insure those convicted of drunk 
driving in the intervening three years.89  Thus the Koon court applied 
the federal requirement that a plaintiff show that she is similarly 
 
 86. Id. at 6234. 
 87. See generally Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 
Case No. 95-067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & 
Chippewa Indians, July 20, 2001); see also Koon v. Grand Traverse of Ottawa & 
Chippewa Indians, Case No. 95-067-048-CV (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of 
Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, Aug. 31, 1996)  (stating that the court understands 
plaintiff’s equal protection claim to be grounded in the tribal constitution). 
 88. Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-067-
048-CV, slip op. at 3–4 (Tribal Ct. of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa 
Indians, July 20, 2001). 
 89. Id. slip op. at 4. 
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situated to a male employee who was treated more favorably before 
she can win a sex-based equal protection case.90   
4. Summary of Tribal Equal Protection Cases 
The limited available tribal case law on sex-based equal protec-
tion demonstrates that tribes take different approaches to construing 
equal protection guarantees in the context of a charge of sex 
discrimination.  Some tribes, such as Turtle Mountain and Grand 
Traverse, appear to undertake an equal protection analysis that is 
more similar to the federal approach to the question, while other 
tribes, such as Winnebago, will be more likely to reject sex discrimina-
tion claims that implicitly challenge traditional tribal gender roles.  
Given the legacy of colonialism and the fact that tribes have had to 
strive to maintain their separate existence against numerous federal 
policies that were designed to assimilate them,91 it is not surprising to 
see at least some tribes forging definitions of equal protection that 
differ from federal definitions.  It is perhaps more surprising that 
some tribes appear to accept the federal framework as is.92  Regardless 
of whether one sees it as advantageous for tribes to adopt discrimina-
tion laws that are similar to federal laws or hopes that tribes will adopt 
unique frameworks of discrimination law, it is clear that even this 
small number of cases demonstrates that tribes do take diverse 
approaches to the issue of sex discrimination and that the tribes 
whose laws were examined here view equal protection guarantees as 
protecting individuals from sex discrimination. 
 
 90. Id.; see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher & Zeke Fletcher, A Restatement of the 
Common Law of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 7 TRIBAL L. J.  
§ 6.02 & n.117 (2006-07) (describing Koon as requiring a female employee to show 
that she is similarly situated to a male who was treated more favorably). 
 91. See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES & COMMENTARY 103–
04, 139–42 (2008) (describing federal assimilationist policies such as allotment and 
termination). 
 92. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 51, at 273, 279 (stating that, “[o]verall, any 
solution that rejects the dominant culture’s model and accommodates the particular 
needs of Tribal communities would be an improvement” over wholesale incorpora-
tion of the federal conception of due process and that “[t]he central premise of this 
Article is that Euro-American law and jurisprudence is uniquely unsuited to Indian 
Tribes and Tribal Courts”). 
25
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B. Tribal Constitutions Explicitly Incorporating U.S. Constitutional 
Rights 
In addition to the tribal statutes and constitutions providing gen-
eral guarantees of equal protection, several tribal constitutions were 
identified that explicitly incorporate federal constitutional rights.93  
For example, the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe’s Constitution provides 
that “no member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or 
guarantees enjoyed by other citizens of the United States.” 94  In 
contrast to a general equal protection guarantee under the applicable 
tribal constitution or under the ICRA, which may, as discussed above, 
be subject to diverse interpretations in the context of a sex-based 
classification, tribal courts construing tribal constitutional provisions 
that explicitly incorporate federal constitutional rights appear to be 
likely to treat sex-based classifications similarly to federal courts 
construing the U.S. Constitution and therefore will most likely view 
such classifications as inherently suspect and subject to intermediate 
scrutiny.95  It is possible that these provisions are common, and they 
 
 93. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN TRIBES OF 
THE COLORADO RIVER INDIAN RESERVATION ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA art. III, § 3, 
microformed on Indian Tribal Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes 
(Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (“All rights secured to the citizens of the United States of 
America by the Federal or State Constitutions shall not be impaired or abridged by 
this constitution and bylaws.”); CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE LUMMI TRIBE OF THE 
LUMMI RESERVATION, WASHINGTON AS AMENDED art. VIII, microformed on Indian Tribal 
Codes: A Microfiche Collection of Indian Law Codes (Ralph Johnson ed. 1988) (“All 
members of the Lummi Indian Tribe shall be accorded equal rights pursuant to tribal 
law.  No member shall be denied any of the rights or guarantees enjoyed by non-
Indian citizens under the Constitution of the United States . . . .”); REVISED 
CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. III, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constandbylaws.htm (“no 
member shall be denied any of the constitutional rights or guarantees enjoyed by 
other citizens of the United States . . . .”); Hudson v.  Hoh Tribal Bus. Comm., No. 
HOH-CIV-4/91-015, 2 Tribal Appellate Court Opinions of the Northwest Intertribal 
Ct. Sys. 160, 161 (Hoh Tribal Ct. of App., May 28, 1992) (quoting Article IX of the 
Hoh Tribal Constitution as stating that “‘[a]ll members of the Hoh Tribe shall be 
accorded equal protection of the law under this constitution’” and that “‘[n]o 
member shall be denied any of the rights or guarantees enjoyed by citizens under the 
Constitution of the United States’”). 
 94. REVISED CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE MINNESOTA CHIPPEWA TRIBE art. III, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chippewa_constand
bylaws.htm. 
 95. See, e.g., Hudson, 2 Tribal Appellate Court Opinions of the Northwest 
Intertribal Ct. Sys. at 163–64 (construing right to petition for redress of grievances 
provided for in the Hoh tribal constitution according to federal constitutional 
principles because the tribal constitution explicitly incorporated federal constitution-
26
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should be taken into account in any attempt to determine whether a 
given tribe prohibits sex discrimination.96 
C. The Navajo Nation’s Broad-Based, Explicit Prohibition on Sex 
Discrimination 
The Navajo Nation was the only tribe identified that had a broad-
based provision of law in place that prohibits governmental sex 
discrimination in all facets of tribal life.97  The Navajo Nation Bill of 
Rights provision, enacted in 1980, provides that “[e]quality of rights 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation 
on account of sex.”98  Moreover, Navajo’s broad-based statutory 
provision functions similarly to a constitutional provision in that it 
empowers the tribal court to strike down conflicting statutory 
enactments.99  
No tribal constitution was identified that contained a similarly 
broad prohibition on sex discrimination,100 although several tribes 
constitutionally prohibit sex discrimination in voting,101 and it appears 
 
al rights).  
 96. Because my electronic searches were for explicitly sex-based terms, the 
prevalence of such provisions is probably significantly underrepresented here.  See 
supra Part I.E (explaining searching methodology).    
 97. 1 NAVAJO NATION CODE  § 3 (“Equality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the Navajo Nation on account of sex . . . .”), available at  
http://www.navajocourts.org/Harmonization/NavBillRights.htm. 
 98. Id.; Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Election Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 63 (Navajo Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1990), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm.  
 99. Bennett, No A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 39–40.    
 100. Additionally, Elmer Rusco undertook a survey of the civil liberties protec-
tions provided for in 220 tribal constitutions that were in place as of September 1981, 
and he identified no broad-based prohibitions on sex discrimination.  Elmer R. 
Rusco, Civil Liberties Guarantees Under Tribal Law:  A Survey of Civil Rights Provisions in 
Tribal Constitutions, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 269, 270, 284, 290 (1990).  However, as his 
survey is now out-of-date, it is possible that some tribal constitutions explicitly prohibit 
sex discrimination generally, although I was not able to locate them in my searches. 
 101. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP 
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1, available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm; CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE 
(CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm; CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED 
TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm; 
see also CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA art. 
IV, § 4 available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/ias&fcons.html (prohibiting sex-based 
disqualification from holding tribal office).   
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that at least two tribes have seriously considered adopting broad-based 
constitutional proscriptions against sex discrimination.102   
To the extent a culture’s responsiveness to sex discrimination can 
be seen as a measure of its progressiveness, Navajo appears to be more 
progressive than the United States, given the United States’ failure to 
ratify a proposed amendment to the constitution that would have 
definitively outlawed sex discrimination.103  The Navajo law is written 
to capture a broad spectrum of discriminatory conduct.  The Nation’s 
Bill of Rights prohibits the Navajo Nation from “den[ying] or 
abridg[ing]” “[e]quality of rights under the law . . . on account of 
sex . . . .”104  While it is not clear whether the concept of “equality of 
rights” differs from that of “equal protection,” the Nation’s prohibi-
tion on abridging equality increases the breadth of the provision 
because, as the Navajo Supreme Court has suggested, the provision 
allows for challenges to practices that burden some groups more than 
others (rather than requiring a stronger showing of explicit or 
intentional discrimination).105  In consonance with the provision’s 
 
 102. Initially, it appeared that the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians 
had in place such a broad-based provision, based on a document downloaded from 
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center.  See TURTLE MOUNTAIN BAND OF 
CHIPPEWA BILL OF RIGHTS (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/turtle_mountain_billofrights.htm.  However, the document appeared to be 
a draft and was not included in the tribe’s constitution, which is also available from 
the National Tribal Justice Resource Center.  CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE TURTLE 
MOUNTAIN BAND OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS BELCOURT, NORTH DAKOTA, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/tmconst.html.  To resolve the 
question, I contacted the tribal government; the Records Manager reported that she 
had no knowledge of the Bill of Rights and did not believe it was current law.  E-mail 
from Jolean Peltier, Records Manager, Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indian 
Belcourt, North Dakota, to Ann Tweedy, Teaching Fellow, California Western School 
of Law, (Aug. 8, 2008) (on file with author).  Similarly, the Hopi Tribe initially 
appeared to have such a constitutional provision in place, CONSTITUTION OF THE HOPI 
TRIBE art. IX, § 1(i), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
hopi_const.htm, but, based on my communication with the Hopi Tribe Secretary’s 
Office, it appears that only a 2003 unapproved Draft Constitution contains this 
provision.  Interview with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office (Oct. 1, 2008); see also 
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE art. IX, § 1 (1993), available at 
http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=50&group=13.   
 103. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Amending the Exceptions Clause, 92 MINN. L. REV. 971, 
971 n.2 (2008); Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1138, 1138 n.160. 
 104. 1 NAVAJO NATION CODE § 3, available at http://www.navajocourts.org/
Harmonization/NavBillRights.htm. 
 105. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 64 (Navajo Sup. Ct., Dec. 12, 1990), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm 
(suggesting that a law that caused disparate impact based on sex would violate the 
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language, the Court of Appeals of the Navajo Nation has interpreted 
the provision regarding sex discrimination very broadly, in a manner 
that would appear to invalidate any sex-based distinction that caused 
either sex disproportionate harm:  
The proper analysis of the Navajo Equal Rights guarantee is 
that there can be no legal result on account of a persons 
[sic] sex, no presumption in giving benefits or disabilities 
gaged by a person’s sex and no legal policy which has the 
effect of favoring one sex or the other.106 
Although, based on this opinion and other case law, it appeared 
 
Navajo Bill of Rights).  The language regarding denial or abridgment is derived from 
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Bennett, 
No. A-CV-26-90, 1990.NANN.0000016 at ¶ 63.  Similar language is contained in the 
voting rights amendments to the United States Constitution.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, 
§ 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.  But these Amendments, by their terms, are limited to 
voting issues.   Outside of the voting context, the United States has been less 
protective of potential victims of discrimination than the Navajo Nation appears to 
be, and the United States has upheld sex-based classifications in some circumstances 
and sharply limited disparate impact claims, particularly in the equal protection 
context.  See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (upholding the validity of 
federal distinctions between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers that affect a 
child’s ability to benefit from the parent’s immigration status in order to gain 
admittance to the United States); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (holding 
that statistical evidence that black defendants were more likely to get the death 
penalty for killing white victims was not problematic under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the lack of evidence of discrimina-
tory intent); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006) (providing for employment discrimina-
tion claims based on disparate impact under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
but only where the employer cannot show that the challenged practice is “job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity”).  Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court recently made clear that it views disparate impact as merely a 
secondary part of Title VII, which it sees as more directly concerned with disparate 
treatment, and that an employer who wishes to voluntarily eliminate disparate 
impacts will face a high burden to justify its behavior when affected employees can 
plausibly claim disparate treatment as a result of the employers’ efforts.  See generally 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009); cf. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 
Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that a casino’s employee grooming requirements that mandated that women wear 
full-face make-up obviously burdened women more than men, who were not subject 
to a similarly burdensome grooming requirement, and that the Majority should, 
therefore, have struck down the requirements under Title VII); ANNA KIRKLAND, FAT 
RIGHTS 87–88 (2008) (describing the majority opinion in Jespersen).  Moreover, even 
in the voting rights context, the U.S. Supreme Court has sometimes seemed loathe to 
look closely at potential disparate impacts.  See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1622–23 (April 28, 2008); see also id. at 1626 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 106. Help v. Silvers, No. A-CV-01-82, 1983.NANN.0000001, ¶ 32 (Navajo May 6, 
1983), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/1983.NANN.0000001.htm. 
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that any sex-based distinction that favored one sex over the other in 
any measure would not survive a Navajo Nation Bill of Rights chal-
lenge,107 one Navajo Supreme Court case allowed sex, based on 
traditional Navajo cultural norms that highly-valued grazing rights 
generally are to descend to female relatives, to factor into the issue of 
the descent of such rights.108  From the main opinion, it does not 
appear that the Bill of Rights issue was raised by the parties, but 
Justice Benally argued in a concurring opinion that the court’s 
holding violated the Bill of Rights’ prohibition of sex discrimina-
tion.109  The majority responded to this argument in a footnote, 
stating that 
Contrary to the characterization in the dissenting110 [sic] 
opinion, this opinion does not mean that the gender of the 
claimant is dispositive . . . .  In fact, the rule set out in this 
opinion is that the Keedah factors111 and traditional law on 
women’s role in Navajo society should be considered to-
gether to decide the most logical trustee, not that if a female 
and a male both claim the permit, regardless of their con-
nections to the land, the permit automatically must go to the 
female.112 
Thus, in the above footnote, the court functionally characterizes 
 
 107. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶¶ 63–65 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s unelaborated claim that a requirement of prior tribal 
employment for holding elected office constituted impermissible sex discrimination 
under the Navajo Bill of Rights and stating that “Bennett did not show how or why it 
caused a discriminatory or disparate impact on those of her gender, excluding or 
inhibiting them from public elective office” and that “[w]hile it may be true that in 
the past women have been excluded or discouraged from the ranks of the Navajo 
Nation Council . . . Bennett was denied a place on the ballot because she had not 
been employed by the Navajo tribal organization.  The Court is sensitive to the 
possibility of a past pattern and practice of excluding women from public office, but 
there are sufficient numbers of women employed by the Navajo Nation to make it 
possible for many to run for public office under the statute”). 
 108. Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, No. SC-CV-39-04, slip op. at 3–4 & 4 n.5 (Navajo 
June 13, 2007), available at http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions
2007/09Sista%20Riggs%20v%20Estate%20of%20Tom%20Attakai.pdf. 
 109. Id. slip op. at 7 (Benally, J., concurring). 
 110. The majority appears to be mistakenly characterizing the concurrence as a 
dissent.  See id. 
 111. Begay v. Keedah, No. A-CV-09-91, 1991.NANN.0000007 (Navajo Nov 26, 
1991) available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/
1991.NANN.0000007.htm. 
 112. Riggs, No. SC-CV-39-04, slip op. at 4 n.5. 
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the language set forth below, which occurs slightly earlier in the 
opinion, as allowing sex to be factored into the grazing permit 
descent decision: 
Traditionally, women are central to the home and land base.  
They are the vein of the clan line.  The clan line typically 
maintains a land base upon which the clan lives, uses the 
land for grazing and agricultural purposes and maintains 
the land for medicinal and ceremonial purposes . . . . This is 
why women are attached to both the land base and the graz-
ing permits.  For the most part, Navajos maintain and carry 
on the custom that the maternal clan maintains traditional 
grazing and farming areas.113 
The Majority’s characterization of women’s traditional role is, as 
the concurring opinion acknowledges, consistent with the matrilineal 
and matrilocal character of Navajo society.114   
Thus, despite the very strong language prohibiting sex discrimi-
nation in Navajo’s Bill of Rights and the absolute terms of one Navajo 
Appellate opinion, it appears that the Navajo Supreme Court is willing 
to allow sex to be a factor in at least the area of grazing rights 
inheritance when consistent with traditional Navajo culture.  None-
theless, depending on how broadly or narrowly the Navajo Supreme 
Court is willing to make such distinctions, Navajo law concerning sex 
discrimination may well be considerably more stringent than U.S. law 
in terms of the types of distinctions the Navajo courts will uphold.115  
In fact, it is quite possible that such distinctions may be limited to 
highly traditional aspects of Navajo culture.  Moreover, given the 
Navajo Supreme Court’s statement that disparate impact falls within 
the purview of the Bill of Rights provision,116 it appears that the Navajo 
Bill of Rights provision is considerably broader than the U.S. concept 
of equal protection in the very significant area of disparate impact.117 
D. Context-Specific Protections 
In addition to Navajo’s explicit, broad-based provision and the 
more general equal protection provisions discussed above, twenty-five 
 
 113. Id., slip op. at 3. 
 114. Id., slip op. at 7 (Benally, J., concurring). 
 115. See, e.g., supra notes 79, 105 (citing U.S. law). 
 116. Bennett v. Navajo Bd. of Elections Supervisors, No. A-CV-26-90, 
1990.NANN.0000016, ¶ 64 (Navajo Dec. 12, 1990), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1990.NANN.0000016.htm. 
 117. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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tribes were identified that have at least one context-specific law 
explicitly prohibiting sex discrimination.118  Although most of the 
 
 118. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP 
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1 (providing for voting rights regardless of sex), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm; 
CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm (providing for 
voting rights regardless of sex); CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE SAC & FOX TRIBE OF 
THE MISSISSIPPI IN IOWA art. IV, § 4, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/
ias&fcons.html (prohibiting sex-based disqualification from holding tribal office); 
CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION 
OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm (providing for voting rights re-
gardless of sex); BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY LAW & CODES, ORD. TO REGULATE THE 
OPERATION OF GAMING BY THE BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY § 7.27, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/bmgaming.htm (prohibiting sex 
discrimination in operation of gaming enterprise); BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER 
CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/blkftcp3equal.htm (prohibiting creditors from engaging in sex 
discrimination); THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF 
CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination 
in employment); CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA 
COMPREHENSIVE “RULES OF THE COURT” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm (providing 
that there should be no sex-based presumption in child custody cases); THE 
CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON [ORDINANCES], 
§ 480(P)(5)(F), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/gr480
tribhou.htm (providing that the landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can 
be used as a defense to eviction); FORT PECK COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE 2000, tit. 
X, ch. 3, § 304(b), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
fortpeck_justicecode_10.htm (providing that “there shall be no presumption that a 
parent is better suited to be custodial parent based on that parent’s gender”); GRAND 
TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS, tit. 18, ch. 8, § 825,  available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/travcode18gaming.htm (prohibiting gaming operators from discriminating 
based on sex); LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch. 
600, § 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/little
river_ottawa_ordandreg.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment except 
where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER 
CODE ch. 17, pt. II.B., § I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
oglala_lawandorder17.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to 
discriminate in employment based on sex or other grounds); SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE 
OF CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE ch. 83, subch.VII, § 83.702(6), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_stmarie_tribalcode.htm (pro-
viding that the landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can be used as a 
defense to eviction); SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE ch. 59, § 59-07-03, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw59.htm 
(setting out an administrative complaint procedure for worker who believes she has 
been discriminated against based on sex or other grounds); SKOKOMISH TRIBAL CODE 
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provisions identified were part of tribal code, some were constitution-
al provisions, and a few were either created by common law or 
contained in administrative materials.119  In terms of code-based laws 
alone, this means that roughly twenty-two percent of tribes whose 
codes were available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource 
Center had some statutory protection from sex discrimination in 
place.120  All of the sex discrimination laws cited above generally 
demonstrate that each of these twenty-five tribes has a policy against 
 
tit. 4, § 4.02.150(ee), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
skokomish_tribalcode_4.htm (prohibiting gaming operators from discriminating 
based on sex and other grounds); SUSANVILLE RANCHERIA [TRIBAL ORDINANCES] tit. I, § 
7.6.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susvillegaming
entire.htm (prohibiting gaming operation from discriminating based on sex); WHITE 
EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIM. P. 1.02, available at http://www
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder.htm (prohibiting discrim-
ination based on sex and other grounds in application of rules of criminal 
procedure); YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intent-
ional sexual harassment as a civil infraction); Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. 
Trib. 178, 1996 WL 1132752 (Cherokee Nov. 6, 1996) (discussing the sexual 
harassment law of the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma); White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L. 
Rptr. 246, 2008 WL 2690792, at *2 (Ho-Chunk Trial Ct., 2008) (quoting the 
Employment Relations Act of 2004, which prohibits “discriminat[ion] based on 
individual’s sex”); Hoopa Forest Indus. v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159 (Hoopa 
Valley Tribal Ct., 1998) (reviewing and reversing, apparently under tribal common 
law while looking to federal law in an advisory capacity, an agency determination of 
hostile work sexual harassment because the conduct alleged failed to rise to the 
required level of severity and because of other evidentiary problems and also quoting 
the tribal personnel policy’s narrower proscription against sexual harassment); Fargo 
v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Ent., 2 Mashantucket Rptr. 145, 147, 153, 
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6, 1997), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/opinions/opfolder/1997.NAMP.0000030.htm (upholding plaintiff’s term-
ination due to sexual harassment); LaVigne v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians, 32 Indian 
L. Rptr. 6044 (Mohegan Tribal Ct. 2005) (upholding the plaintiff’s termination from 
employment due to “sexual harassment”); cf. Renecker v. Tulalip Casino, No. TUL-
EMP-11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court App. 1, 1–2 (May 29, 1997) (reversing 
appellant’s termination because of procedural errors in the administrative process 
but noting that “any one of the four allegations [of racial and gender slurs] involves 
‘major offenses’” as defined in the Tribe’s Human Rights Ordinance). 
  Notably, Navajo also has other context-specific sex-discrimination laws in 
place, as discussed below.  See, e.g., NAVAJO NATION CODE ANN., 21 Navajo Code § 
509(B) (prohibiting telecommunications service providers from discriminating based 
on sex). 
 119. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra note 118.  Fifteen of the laws cited in note 118 are code provisions 
downloaded from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center. See also supra Part I.E 
(explaining that the codes of sixty-nine tribes were available on the site during the 
period of my research).    
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sex discrimination, although in the case of tribes that both legally 
prohibit sex discrimination in some circumstances and make sex-
based distinctions in others, the policy is necessarily a complicated 
one.121  Some tribes, such as the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 
have several anti-discrimination laws that cover sex discrimination in 
different, rather broad contexts, while other tribes, such as Chitima-
cha Tribe, appear to have only one or two very narrow laws in place.122  
Below is a brief summary of the sex-discrimination laws by category, 
beginning with broader laws and proceeding to narrower ones.  
 
 121. The Oglala Sioux and the Blackfeet are two of the tribes that have both 
multiple laws prohibiting sex discrimination as well as laws that explicitly make sex-
based distinctions.  See, e.g., BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcp3equal.htm 
(prohibiting creditors from engaging in sex discrimination); THE FAMILY COURT OF 
THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF 
ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkft1to22familyct.htm (providing 
that “[t]he Blackfeet Family Court Members will serve and respond to requests 
without bias because of race, religion, sex, age, national origin or handicap”); 
BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 2, § 7, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode2civil.htm (allowing for 
imprisonment of only male debtors in cases of fraud, potential abscondment, or 
removal or concealment of property); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 17, pt. 
II.B., § I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_law and
order17.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to discriminate in 
employment based on sex or other grounds); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 
18, ch. 1, ¶ 8, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
oglala_lawandorder18.htm (stating in “Declaration of Policy” that Contractors and 
Sub-Contractors shall not, in exercising the Tribe’s employment preference for 
Indians, discriminate among Indians on the basis of sex or on other grounds); 
OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 9, § 104, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder9.htm (creating the crime of 
having carnal knowledge of a female under the age of sixteen). 
 122. Compare THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF 
CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribalresource 
center.org/ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in 
employment), and THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF 
CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-4.09(a)(4), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech16gaming.htm (providing that “[t]here shall 
be no discrimination in any gaming operations by reason of race, color, sex or 
creed”), and THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF 
CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5, available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm (providing for compli-
ance with, subjection to, charging under, and jurisdiction pursuant to criminal laws to 
be without regard to sex or other prohibited grounds), with CHITIMACHA 
COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE “RULES OF THE 
COURT” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm (no sex-based presumption in custody cases). 
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1. Employment 
a. Sex Discrimination Explicitly Prohibited in Employment 
Generally 
Four tribes have broadly worded, explicit prohibitions on sex 
discrimination in employment in their tribal codes,123 and two other 
tribes appear to have such laws in place based on discussions in tribal 
court opinions.124  One of the four tribes, the Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians, carves out an exception to the prohibition where sex 
is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).125  This BFOQ 
 
 123. THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE 
INDIANS ch. 95, art. II, § 95-13(c), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/eccodech95wages.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment); 
LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch. 600, § 2.2, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordand
reg.htm (prohibiting sex discrimination in employment except where sex is a bona 
fide occupational qualification);  OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 17, pt. II.B, § 
I, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_ lawandorder17
.htm (declaring it to be the policy of the tribe not to discriminate in employment 
based on sex or other grounds); SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE ch. 59, § 59-07-03, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sisseton_wahpeton_code
oflaw59.htm (setting out administrative complaint procedure for a worker who 
believes she has been discriminated against based on sex or other grounds). 
  Note that a provision in the Susanville Indian Rancheria’s Bylaws also 
requires the Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an environment that is free 
from discrimination.”  SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS art. III, 
§ 4(6), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susanvilleconst.htm.  
The later mention of “sexual harassment” in this provision may imply that the 
generic reference to “discrimination” is meant to include sex discrimination.  Id.  
However, because the reference to sex discrimination was not explicit, this provision 
is only relied on in the sexual harassment discussion. 
 124. White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 246, 2008 WL 2690792, at *2 (Ho-Chunk 
Trial Ct. Jan. 14, 2008) (quoting the Employment Relations Act of 2004, which 
prohibits “discriminat[ion] based on individual’s sex”); Renecker v. Tulalip Casino, 
No. TUL-EMP-11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court App. 1, 1-2 (May 29, 1997) 
(reversing appellant’s termination because of procedural errors in the administrative 
process but noting that “any one of the four allegations [of racial and gender slurs] 
involves ‘major offenses’” as defined in the Tribe’s “detailed Human Rights 
Ordinance”); see also Funmaker v. Doornbos, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6095, 6095 (Ho-
Chunk Nation Tribal Court, August 22, 1996) (quoting prohibition on sex discrimi-
nation in employment in the Tribe’s Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual). 
 125. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS ch. 100, 
§ 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm.  A bona fide occupational qualification means that “[e]mployment 
in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or 
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is 
an actual qualification for performing the job.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th 
ed., 1990); see also KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93 (explaining the concept of a 
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exception also applies to age and disability; however, it does not apply 
to race, marital status, national origin, or other specified suspect 
classes.126  This differentiation may indicate that sex is considered to 
be less inherently suspect in that Tribe than the categories, such as 
race, that are not subject to the exception.127  Federal law similarly 
provides that a bona fide occupational qualification may be a defense 
to allegations of sex discrimination but not race discrimination.128  It 
may be the case that the three tribes whose codes do not provide for a 
BFOQ defense would not allow for one under common law if the 
issue was raised in a case or administrative proceeding.  Thus, these 
three tribes may take a harder line on sex discrimination than would a 
federal court.129  However, it is difficult to make predictions about 
such issues. 
b. Specialized Categories of Employment 
i. Employment by Contractors and Subcontractors 
One of the six tribes that has in place a general prohibition on 
sex discrimination in employment, the Oglala Sioux, also has a law 
providing that “[c]ontractors or subcontractors extending such 
preference [to Indians] shall not, however, discriminate among 
Indians on the basis of religion, sex, or tribal affiliation, and the use of 
such a preference [for Indian employees] shall not excuse a contrac-
tor or subcontractor from complying with the other requirements 
contained in this chapter.”130 
 
BFOQ exception and its meaning under federal law, particularly its indication that 
sex differentiations need not be eliminated in all cases, in contrast to race differentia-
tions). 
 126. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS, ch. 100, 
§ 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm. 
 127. See, e.g., KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93 (explaining that, under federal 
law, the BFOQ exception indicates that laws creating sex differentiations need not be 
eliminated in all cases, in contrast to laws creating race differentiations and that this 
difference indicates more societal tolerance for sex-based distinctions than for race-
based distinctions). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006); see also KIRKLAND, supra note 105, at 90–93 
(explaining the concept of a BFOQ and its meaning under federal law, particularly its 
indication that laws providing for sex differentiations need not be eliminated in all 
cases, in contrast to laws providing for race differentiations). 
 129. See Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 20, at 35 (explaining that tribal “codes 
usually aspire to cover all eventualities”). 
 130. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 18, ch. 1, ¶ 8, available at http://www
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ii. Gaming 
A total of six tribes, including two of the six that have prohibi-
tions on sex discrimination in employment and one, the Navajo, that 
has a broad-based general prohibition on sex discrimination general-
ly, prohibit sex discrimination in the operation of their gaming 
enterprises.131  Given that these tribes’ gaming enterprises may well be 
the largest employer among the tribal government and its enterprises 
or even in the geographical area for some of the more rural tribes, 
these laws are a significant source of protection.  
c. Sexual Harassment 
Evaluating tribal protections against sexual harassment is compli-
cated somewhat by the fact that some tribes, contrary to the tradition-
al federal view, consider sexual harassment to be an act perpetrated 
by one individual against another, rather than an employment rights 
issue.132  Such tribes may treat harassment, implicitly or explicitly 
including sexual harassment, as a civil infraction, a misdemeanor, or 
even a tort.133  Other tribes consider sexual harassment to be an 
 
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder18.htm. 
 131. BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY LAW & CODES, ORDINANCE TO REGULATE THE 
OPERATION OF GAMING BY THE BAY MILLS INDIAN COMMUNITY, § 7.27, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/bmgaming.htm (prohibiting sex 
discrimination in operation of gaming enterprise); THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED 
BY ORDER OF THE EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS, ch. 16, art. IV, § 16-4.09(a)(4), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech16gaming.htm 
(“There shall be no discrimination in any gaming operations by reason of race, color, 
sex or creed . . . .”); GRAND TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE 
BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS, tit. 18, ch. 8, § 825, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/travcode18gaming.htm (prohibiting 
gaming operators from discriminating based on sex); NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 5, § 
2039(B)(3) (2008) (“[t]he Navajo Nation, the gaming enterprise and a Management 
Contractor shall not discriminate in the employment of persons to work for the 
gaming enterprise or the Gaming Facility on the grounds of . . . gender . . . .”); 
SKOKOMISH TRIBAL CODE, tit. 4, § 4.02.150(ee), available at http://www.tribal resource
center.org/ccfolder1/skokomish_tribalcode_4.htm (prohibiting gaming operators 
from discriminating based on sex and other grounds); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA 
[ORDINANCES], tit. I, § 7.6.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/susvillegamingentire.htm (prohibiting gaming operation from discrimin-
ating based on sex or other grounds). 
 132. See, e.g., YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F) 
(defining intentional sexual harassment as a civil infraction), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm.   
 133. See, e.g., POARCH BAND OF CREEK INDIANS CODE, ch. 8, § 8-2-2 (defining the 
crime of harassment, without explicit mention of sexual harassment, as a misdemean-
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employment issue but define it as a potential basis for discipline of the 
harassing employee rather than explicitly defining it as the basis for a 
cause of action by the injured employee.134   
Because this subpart is specifically limited to laws that explicitly 
apply to sex discrimination, this section on sexual harassment does 
not include the laws that simply provide protection against harass-
ment without discussion of sexual harassment.  However, the Ysleta 
Pueblo del Sur law that defines “sexual harassment” as a prohibited 
 
or that involves “strik[ing], shov[ing], kick[ing], or otherwise touch[ing] a person or 
subject[ing] him to physical contact; or . . . direct[ing] abusive or obscene language 
or mak[ing] an obscene gesture toward another person”); YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO 
CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intentional sexual harassment 
explicitly as a type of harassment that is punishable as a civil infraction); Hoopa 
Forest Industries v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. 
1998) (quoting the tribe’s personnel policy as providing that “[e]mployees shall be 
provided a safe work environment, free from harassment of any sort, i.e., verbal, 
physical, visual.  The Tribal Council accepts no liability for harassment of one 
employee by another.  The individual who makes unwelcome advances, threatens or 
in any way harasses another employee is personally liable for such actions and their 
consequences.”). 
  The tribal view of sexual harassment as a crime is similar to that of the 
French law, under which sexual harassment is treated as a criminal matter specific to 
the perpetrator (rather than creating any employer liability).  Abigail C. Saguy, What 
is Sexual Harassment?  From Capitol Hill to Sorbonne, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 45, 47–48 
(2004).  Although there is also a sexual harassment provision in the French Labor 
Code, this merely protects an employee from retaliation, rather than imposing direct 
employer liability.  Id. at 48. 
 134. See, e.g., Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 178, 1996 WL 1132752 
(Nov. 6, 1996); Fargo v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 2 Mashantucket 
Rptr. 145, 147, 153, 1997 WL 34639655 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6, 
1997); LaVigne v. Mohegan Tribe of Indians, 32 Indian L. Rptr. 6044 (Mohegan 
Tribal Ct. 2005); see also Yazzie v. Sanitation, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 543, 2007 WL 
5884947, *3–4 (Navajo July 11, 2007) ((1) reciting the fact that Navajo Nation has a 
sexual harassment policy for tribal employees, (2) dismissing plaintiff’s claim against 
her employer for sexual harassment, which had originally been brought before the 
Navajo Nation Labor Commission, because it was not cognizable under the Navajo 
Nation Preference in Employment Act and because such a claim should not be read 
into the Act as sexual harassment was still in a “nascent stage” of development in the 
Navajo environment, and (3) suggesting the possibility that the claim could be heard 
in the Navajo district court); cf. Schock v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 3 
Mashantucket Rptr. 129, 1999 WL 34828705 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Sept. 
20, 1999) (holding plaintiff’s sexual harassment claim against the tribal gaming 
enterprise to be barred by sovereign immunity because, although the perpetrator 
acted during work hours, he did not, according to the court, act within the scope of 
his employment, but allowing plaintiff’s negligent supervision claims that were based 
on the same harassing behavior to go to trial because the tribe had enacted a waiver 
of sovereign immunity for negligence-based actions). 
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type of harassment is included although the application of that law is 
personal to the perpetrator and applies more broadly than solely in 
the employment context.135  Although some ambiguities remain, in 
all, nine tribes appear to have policies or laws in place that prohibit 
sexual harassment in the workplace136 and one tribe has directed its 
 
 135. See, e.g., YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm 
(defining intentional sexual harassment as a civil infraction).  Similarly, the Hoopa 
Valley Tribe is included based on case law that suggests that that Tribe may allow both 
claims against the employer and claims against the individual perpetrator in the 
employment context.  Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1. 
 136. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch.17, pt. III (under section heading 
entitled “Interviewing, Screening, and Testing,” requiring comprehensive 
background check on all applicants for employment, including determination of 
whether the applicant has been subject to “dismissal[s] from previous jobs due to 
sexual harassment”); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, BYLAWS, 
art. III, § 4(6), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ 
 susanvilleconst.htm (requiring the Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an 
environment that is free of discrimination, harassment, violence, and intimidation 
and that is drug free, as required by law. The Tribal Business Council shall not 
tolerate any form of threatening or abusive behavior, nor tolerated [sic] sexual 
harassment or other forms of harassment or discrimination . . . .”); YSLETA DEL SUR 
PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at http://www.tribal
resourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm (defining intentional sexual 
harassment as a civil infraction); Brooks v. Cherokee Nation, 5 Okla. Trib. 178, 1996 
WL 1132752 (Nov. 6, 1996) (upholding dismissal of tribal employee for sexual 
harassment); Lonetree v. Garvin, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6126 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 8, 2007) (Plaintiff, who had been dismissed from tribal employment for sexual 
harassment, challenged the administrative proceedings based on due process, and, 
“[b]ecause the [plaintiff did] . . . not deny that he committed sexual harassment,” 
the Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court “affirm[ed] the trial court’s decision to 
remand to the GRB [Grievance Review Board] to resolve the sole issue of whether the 
[defendant] . . . would have terminated the [plaintiff’s] . . . employment even if the 
pre-deprivation hearing had occurred”); Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1 
(reversing a tribal agency’s determination that the employer was liable for sexual 
harassment based upon the facts that the agency had not entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, that the agency had relied on an exhibit that was not in the 
record, and that the conduct at issue did not rise to the level of severity required 
under federal standards, which the court appeared to be using in an advisory 
capacity, despite the statement in tribal personnel policies that only an individual 
harasser could be held liable for sexual harassment); Fargo v. Mashantucket Pequot 
Gaming Enterprise, 2 Mashantucket Rptr. 145, 147, 153, 1997 WL 34639655 
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Oct. 6, 1997) (upholding tribal employee’s 
termination for sexual harassment and citing Employee Handbook’s provision on 
sexual harassment); LaVigne, 32 Indian L. Rptr. at 6045 (finding as fact that 
“Mohegan Tribe Policy #51 strictly forbids sexual harassment in the workplace”); 
Yazzie, 7 Am. Tribal L. 543, 2007 WL 5884947, at *3 (reciting the fact that Navajo 
Nation has a sexual harassment policy for tribal employees); see also Toledo v. Bashas’ 
Diné Market, 6 Am. Tribal L. 796, 2006 WL 6168967 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. Aug. 17, 
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general manager to create such a policy,137 so it may now in fact have a 
policy in place.  Two of these tribes also prohibit employment 
discrimination based on sex generally, and two of them prohibit it in 
the gaming context.138  Finally, Navajo, one of the two that has both a 
prohibition on sexual harassment and a prohibition on sex discrimi-
nation in its gaming operation, also has a broad-based tribal prohibi-
tion on sex discrimination, as discussed above.  Thus, it appears that 
some tribes recognize sexual harassment that do not explicitly 
recognize other forms of sex discrimination.139 
d. Maternity and Paternity Leave and Related Laws 
While not a sex discrimination law per se, at least one tribe, the 
 
2006) (affirming private on-reservation employer’s dismissal of employee based on 
sexual harassment under the employer’s personnel policy, despite the ambiguity of 
the policy). 
  Note that the language of the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo law appears to be 
particularly relevant to the employment context: “‘Sexual Harassment’ means 
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature, submission to which is made a term or condition of a 
person’s exercise or enjoyment of any right, privilege, power, or immunity, either 
explicitly or implicitly.”  YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.22 
(emphasis omitted), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ ccfolder1/
ysletaarticle4.htm. 
 137. THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OREGON 
[ORDINANCES], § 370(d)(3), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
ccfolder1/gr370personnel.htm (“The General Manager shall develop and implement 
policies and procedures to prevent the sexual harassment of employees, applicants, 
clients and Tribal members.”). 
 138. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 5, § 2039(B)(3) (prohibiting sex discrimination by 
gaming operation); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 17, pt. II.B., § I, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder17.htm 
(declaring it to be the policy of the Tribe not to discriminate in employment based 
on sex or other grounds); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA [ORDINANCES], tit. I, § 7.6.2, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susvillegamingentire.htm 
(prohibiting gaming operation from discriminating based on sex or other grounds); 
Funmaker v. Doornbos, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6095, 6095 (Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Ct. 
August 22, 1996) (quoting prohibition on sex discrimination in employment in the 
Tribe’s Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual). 
 139. The Ysleta Pueblo del Sur law is the most probable example of this.  See 
YSLETA DEL SUR PUEBLO CODE OF LAWS, art. 4, pt. 6, § 4.6.20(F), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ysletaarticle4.htm.  The two other 
tribes’ recognition of sexual harassment claims is evident from case law, and thus it is 
entirely possible either that their courts would hold that sex discrimination is also 
prohibited as a matter of common law or that the tribes have formal laws or policies 
prohibiting such conduct.  Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 & n.1; LaVigne, 32 Indian 
L. Rptr. at 6045.  
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Little River Band of Ottawa Indians, has enacted a law allowing its 
employees to take maternity or paternity leave.140  Such laws are 
relevant to sex discrimination because of the disproportionate 
impacts that women suffer in employment because of pregnancy.141 
Similarly, the Ho-Chunk Nation currently has a law in place that 
prohibits pregnancy-based discrimination142 and the Navajo Nation 
progressively requires all on-reservation employers to provide 
breastfeeding accommodations for their employees who are working 
mothers.143   
One interesting aspect of the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ 
law is that its express purpose is to protect the children that would be 
affected by a failure to grant maternity (or paternity) leave to full-time 
employees: “The Little River Band recognizes that its children are its 
most precious asset and that the promotion of strong families is 
critical.  With this recognition, the Tribe has adopted the following 
policies regarding maternity leave.”144  Thus, although it clearly 
 
 140. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, ch. VI, 
§ 6.10, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_
ordandreg.htm. 
 141. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006) (codifying federal Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act); see generally Daniela M. de la Piedra, Flirting with the PDA: Congress 
Must Give Birth to Accommodation Rights that Protect Working Women, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER 
& L. 275 (2008). 
 142. White v. Day, 7 Am. Tribal L. Rptr. 246, 246, 2008 WL 269072, at *2 (Ho-
Chunk Trial Ct. 2008).   
 143. NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, § 704 (2008).  By contrast, in the United States 
outside of Indian reservations, breastfeeding accommodations appear to be largely a 
matter of employer choice.  See generally Sara J. Welch, Nursing Mothers Aloft, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, at B6 (discussing two U.S. employers who voluntarily provide 
breastfeeding accommodations to working mothers who must travel while breastfeed-
ing and the difficulty of traveling while breastfeeding generally); Jodi Kantor, On the 
Job, Working Mothers Are Finding a 2-Class System, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at A1 (noting 
that working class women have much more difficulty continuing with breastfeeding 
while working than do professional women, that there is no federal law providing for 
breastfeeding accommodations on the job, and that most state laws on the issue are 
“merely symbolic”).  However, as of 2007, fourteen states had laws that protected or 
encouraged breastfeeding on the job, at least to some degree.  Lisa Hansen, A 
Comprehensive Framework for Accommodating Nursing Mothers in the Workplace, 59 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 885, 908–11 (2007). 
  Because my electronic searches of tribal codes and constitutions did not 
target the words “pregnancy,” “breastfeeding,” “maternity,” or “paternity,” there 
may be many other similar tribal laws in existence that I did not discover.   
 144. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, ch. 
600, ch. VI, § 6.10 (2001), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ 
ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm; see also NAVAJO NATION CODE tit. 15, 
§ 702 (2008) (“The purpose of this Act is to provide for opportunities for working 
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protects women’s ability to maintain employment while pregnant 
(and therefore protects women from discrimination), the primary 
purpose of this particular tribal law was not to protect against 
employment discrimination. 
e. Summary of Employment-Related Tribal Sex Discrimination 
Laws 
A significant percentage of tribes appear to have some statutory 
protection against sex discrimination in place that applies to employ-
ment.145  The most common types of anti-discrimination laws appear 
to apply to employment generally, gaming, and sexual harassment.  
There are likely to be many additional protections in tribal personnel 
policies, but, because such policies are not widely available, they were 
not addressed here except to the extent that discussion of such 
policies was included in tribal case law. 
2. Voting and Other Political Rights 
a. Voting Rights 
The constitutions of three tribes, namely the Fort Belknap Indian 
Community, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, and the Confederated 
Tribes of the Warm Spring Reservation, outlaw sex discrimination in 
voting.146  These provisions are roughly analogous to the Nineteenth 
 
mothers to obtain the health benefits of breast-feeding . . . .”). 
 145. As explained above, roughly twenty-two percent of tribes whose codes were 
available online from the National Tribal Justice Resource Center had some statutory 
protection from sex discrimination in place.  This figure is based on the fact that 
fifteen of the laws cited in supra note 118 are code provisions downloaded from the 
National Tribal Justice Resource Center.  Part I.E. explains that the codes of sixty-nine 
tribes were available on the site during the period of my research.  Eight, or about 
twelve percent, of tribal codes available on the National Tribal Justice Resource 
Center site contained some proscription against discrimination that applied to 
employment. 
 146. CONSTITUTION OF THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY OF THE FORT BELKNAP 
RESERVATION MONTANA art. VII, § 1 (providing for voting rights regardless of sex), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fort_belknap_const.htm; 
CONSTITUTION OF THE MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION art. IV, § 2, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/muscogee_const.htm (providing for 
voting rights regardless of sex); CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE CONFEDERATED 
TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS RESERVATION OREGON AS AMENDED art. IV, § 5, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/warm_springs_constandbylaws.htm 
(providing for voting rights regardless of sex). 
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Amendment to the United States Constitution.147 
b. Rights to Hold Elected Office 
The constitution of the Sac and Fox Tribe of the Mississippi in 
Iowa proscribes sex-based disqualification from holding public 
office.148 
3. Application of the Laws and Rules of Procedure 
Three tribes have code provisions that either prohibit or set a 
policy against sex discrimination in the application of laws or the rules 
of procedure.149   For instance, the Rules of Criminal Procedure for 
the White Earth Band of Chippewa set out an intent not to discrimi-
nate in purpose or effect: “These rules are intended to provide for the 
just and speedy determination of criminal proceedings without the 
purpose or effect of discrimination based upon race, color, creed, 
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, status with regard to 
public assistance, disability, handicap in communication, sexual 
orientation, or age.”150  The Rules’ protection against discrimination 
in both “purpose” and “effect” appears to evince a legislative intent 
that the operation of the rules be free from discriminatory intent as 
well as free from disparate impact on suspect classes such as sex.  
Although, given the use of the word “intent,” the section may be 
merely precatory rather than creating an enforceable obligation, it is 
interesting that it encompasses such a broad conception of fairness, 
 
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote 
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex.”). 
 148. CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE SAC AND FOX TRIBE OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN 
IOWA art. IV, § 4 (prohibiting sex-based disqualification from holding tribal office), 
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/ias&fcons.html. 
 149. THE FAMILY COURT OF THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN 
RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6 
(1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/lkft1to22familyct 
.htm; THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE EAST-
ERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5 (2005), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm#1; 
WHITE EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R. 1.02 (2000), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder
.htm#criminal. 
 150. WHITE EARTH BAND OF CHIPPEWA RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R. 1.02, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/whtearth_lawandorder 
.htm#criminal. 
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which can be contrasted with the “fear of too much justice” that often 
characterizes the American judicial system.151 
Because the Blackfeet provision is part of the Family Court’s 
“Code of Ethics,” it, like the White Earth Chippewa provision, may 
not be directly enforceable, although, alternatively, its strong 
language could be interpreted to dictate enforceability: “The 
Blackfeet Family Court Members will serve and respond to requests 
without bias because of race, religion, sex, age, national origin or 
handicap.”152   
Finally, the Eastern Band of Cherokee provision uses even 
stronger wording and therefore probably creates enforceable 
obligations.153  Additionally, the Cherokee provision may be the most 
remarkable in that it appears to put a complementary onus on the 
individual not to seek exemptions or more favorable treatment based 
on membership in a particular class: 
(a) All persons, regardless of race, age, or sex will comply 
and be subject to the laws of the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians whenever they are within the boundaries of Qualla 
Boundary and its territories. 
(b) All persons, regardless of race, age, or sex will be subject 
to all of the same charges, convictions, and fines that 
enrolled members of the Eastern Band are subject to. 
. . . . 
(e) Tribal jurisdiction on all persons shall be equal and 
nondiscriminatory towards anyone, regardless of race, age, 
or sex as long as they are visiting or living or doing business 
on the lands of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians.154 
 
 151. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 152. THE FAMILY COURT OF THE BLACKFEET TRIBE OF THE BLACKFEET INDIAN 
RESERVATION FAMILY CODE, CODE OF ETHICS FOR BLACKFEET FAMILY COURT MEMBERS R. 6 
(1999), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkft1to22 
familyct.htm. 
 153. THE CHEROKEE CODE: PUBLISHED BY ORDER OF THE TRIBAL COUNCIL OF THE 
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS ch. 14, art. I, § 14-1.5 (2005), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/eccodech14criminallaw.htm#1. 
 154. Id.  The Washington State Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment appears 
to be somewhat similar in terms of defining rights to go hand in hand with 
responsibility.  Machioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 491 (Wash. 1978) (quoting the 
state Equal Rights Amendment as stating that “[e]quality of rights and responsibility 
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex”). 
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4. Prohibition on the Use of Sex-Based Presumptions in Child 
Custody Matters 
Somewhat similar to the laws described above prohibiting dis-
crimination in the application of rules and laws, three tribes have 
code provisions that prohibit the use of sex-based presumptions for 
one parent or another in custody matters.155  A fourth tribe has, in 
case law, rejected as “sexist” the American rule that the domicile of a 
child follows that of his or her mother.156 
5. Miscellaneous Prohibitions on Sex Discrimination 
Finally, a few tribes have prohibitions on sex discrimination that 
apply in other diverse contexts, such as applications for financial 
credit, housing, provision of health services, treatment of prisoners, 
and education. 
a. Credit Applications 
The Blackfeet Tribe disallows creditors from discriminating based 
on sex or other listed grounds “in any aspect of a credit transac-
tion.”157  This provision contains much of the same language as the 
Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act158 and was most likely modeled 
on that Act. 
 
 155. See CHITIMACHA COMPREHENSIVE CODES OF JUSTICE & CHITIMACHA INDIAN 
TRIBAL COURT “RULES OF COURT” tit. VI, ch. 3, § 304(c) (2003), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/chitimcodet6family.htm; FT. PECK 
COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE tit. X, ch. 3, § 304(b) (2000), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fortpeck_justicecode_10.htm; GRAND 
TRAVERSE BAND CODE: STATUTES OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS, tit. 10, ch.5, § 514(b) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter
.org/ccfolder1/travcode10childfameld.htm#5; see also In re Custody of C.A.G., 5 Am. 
Tribal L. 148, 2004 WL 5599397, at *2 (Fort Peck Ct. App. 2004) (applying the tribal 
code’s prohibition on gender-based presumptions). 
 156. Father v. Mother, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 204, slip op. ¶ 28 (Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribal Ct. Mar. 9, 1999), available at http://www.tribal resourcecenter.org/
opinions/opfolder/1999.NAMP.0000010.htm (following a Cheyenne River Sioux 
Tribal Court opinion and rejecting in a child custody case “‘the historically gendered 
and sexist rules of Western common law’” regarding a child’s domicile) (citations 
omitted); see also Fletcher, supra note 78, at 18–20 (discussing Father v. Mother). 
 157. BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE ch. 3, § 4(A)(1)(1999), available at 
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/blkftcp3equal.htm. 
 158. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (2006). 
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b. Health Services 
The Bylaws of Susanville Indian Rancheria’s health clinic require 
the Board of Directors “[t]o ensure operation of the clinic without 
limitation by reason of race, creed, sex or national origin except as 
provided by Congress and federal rules and regulations.”159 
c. Education 
The Oglala Sioux Education Code requires the local school 
board “to develop and implement a student activity program” and 
requires that the development and implementation be conducted in 
an “equitable manner with respect to . . . gender.”160  While the 
United States has a statute generally prohibiting discrimination in 
education based on sex or other enumerated grounds,161 the Oglala 
Sioux provision applies in a much narrower context. 
d. Treatment of Prisoners 
Probably the most unique provision at least among these miscel-
laneous provisions is the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe’s anti-
discrimination provision for prisoners: (1) There shall be no discrim-
ination on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status.  (2) On the other hand, it is necessary to respect the religious 
beliefs and moral precepts of the group to which a prisoner be-
longs.162 
While it is difficult to know how this law operates in practice, the 
law itself is clearly at odds with the federal trend of limiting prisoners’ 
rights and ability to seek relief.163  Moreover, there appears to be no 
 
 159. SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA [ORDINANCES], BYLAWS LASSEN INDIAN HEALTH 
CTR. art. II, § 2(15) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ 
ccfolder1/ susvillehealth.htm. 
 160. OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 26, § VI, 600.10 STANDARD (1996), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawandorder26.htm. 
 161. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (providing, with limited exceptions, that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation 
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).  For an additional 
historical discussion, see Kiselewich, supra note 13, at 219 n.13. 
 162. SISSETON-WAHPETON SIOUX TRIBE, ch. 31, § 31-01-01 (1998), available at 
http://www.ntjrc.org/ccfolder/sisseton_wahpeton_codeoflaw31.htm. 
 163. See, e.g., Risa E. Kaufman, Access to the Courts as a Privilege or Immunity of 
National Citizenship, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1477, 1509–10, 1509 n.159  (2008) (describing 
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federal statutory counterpart to the law; rather, state and federal 
prisoners typically seek relief for sex discrimination by alleging a 
constitutional violation of their right to equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.164  Additionally, while federal 
courts do, at least formally, apply intermediate scrutiny in such cases, 
deference to the prison administration plays a large role.165  By 
contrast, this law, on its face, unqualifiedly prohibits sex discrimina-
tion.   
Thus, like the White Earth Chippewa provision requiring equal 
treatment under the tribe’s rules of criminal procedure and like the 
broad-based Navajo proscription on sex discrimination, this Sisseton-
Wahpeton Sioux provision evidences a strong concern for substantive 
fairness.  Moreover, the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux provision extends 
the concern to one class of persons whose right to fairness under 
federal law has been considerably diminished. 
e. Allowing Tenants to Defend Against Eviction Based on a 
Landlord’s Sex-Based Discrimination 
Two tribes have adopted laws that allow a tenant to defend 
against an eviction on the basis that the eviction is occurring because 
of the tenant’s sex or for other specified discriminatory reasons.166  
These laws are similar to a federal Fair Housing Act regulation that 
prohibits landlords from evicting tenants based on sex or other 
prohibited grounds.167  Thus, as with the Oglala Sioux education 
provision, these two provisions are in accord with a corresponding 
 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act and other recent developments in federal law). 
 164. See, e.g., Jackson v. Thornburgh, 907 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding 
federal law that grants early release to some prisoners, but not long-term female 
offenders in a federal facility, does not violate equal protection); Ashann-Ra v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 112 F. Supp. 2d 559 (W.D. Va. 2000) (holding prison 
grooming policies that differ with respect to gender not to violate equal protection). 
 165. See Ashann-Ra, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 570–71. 
 166. THE CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF THE GRAND RONDE COMMUNITY OF OREGON 
[ORDINANCES], § 480(P)(5)(F) (2003), available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter 
.org/ccfolder1/gr480tribhou.htm (stating that the landlord’s sex discrimination 
against the tenant can be used as a defense to eviction); SAULT STE. MARIE TRIBE OF 
CHIPPEWA INDIANS TRIBAL CODE, ch. 83, sub.-ch. VII, § 83.702(6) (2001), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sault_stmarie_tribalcode.htm (pro-
viding that a landlord’s sex discrimination against the tenant can be used as a defense 
to eviction). 
 167. 24 C.F.R. § 100.60(b)(5) (2009). 
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federal policy against housing discrimination, but they apply more 
narrowly.168   
f. Prohibition on Sex Discrimination by Telecommunications 
Service Providers 
The Navajo Nation has a law in place that provides that “[n]o 
telecommunications service provider shall, as to rates or service, make 
or grant any unreasonable preference or advantage to any person, or 
subject any person to unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage based 
upon . . . sex.”169  It is not clear how the qualifier “unreasonable” 
would be interpreted here, but it appears to allow the companies to 
make some types of sex-based distinctions.  At least one state, Texas, 
has a similar administrative rule prohibiting telecommunications 
service providers from discriminating based on sex.170  
g. Workers’ Compensation for Sex Organ Losses 
Mashantucket Pequot’s inclusion, as of 2000, of loss of female 
genitalia on its table of compensable injuries is another apparent 
move toward gender equity, given that the loss of male genitalia had 
already been included in the table.171  The amendment was apparently 
based upon a similar amendment enacted by the State of Connecti-
cut.172 
6. Summary of Context-Specific Sex Discrimination Laws 
Tribes have adopted a broad range of policies and laws that pro-
tect against sex discrimination in myriad contexts.  While many of 
them apply in narrow circumstances, such as eviction, others are quite 
broad, applying for example to all sex-based employment discrimina-
tion.  Often these laws appear to reflect a deeper level of concern for 
 
 168. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006). 
 169. NAVAJO NATION CODE, tit. 21, § 509(B) (2008). 
 170. Public Utilities Commission of Texas, Substantive Rules, ch. 26, § 26.21 
(1999), available at http://www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26toc-I/
26toc-I.pdf (prohibiting the certified telecommunications utilities from discrim-
inating based on race, nationality, color, religion, sex, marital status, income level, 
source of income, and from unreasonable discrimination on the basis of geographic 
location).  
 171. See MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ANN., tit. 13, ch. 4, § 12(b) (2008), 
available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/mpcode/13workerscomp.pdf; see also tit. 
13, ch. 4, § 12(b) cmt. B(6). 
 172. Id. tit. 13, ch. 4, § 12(b) cmt. B(6). 
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substantive fairness than do federal laws, and the laws sometimes 
apply in contexts, such as prisoner rights, that are unusual by U.S. 
standards.  In a few cases, the laws appear to be modeled after similar 
federal laws.  The diversity of these laws suggests that tribes are indeed 
“‘laboratories for democracy,’” as Raymond Etcitty, Legislative 
Counsel for the Navajo Nation, has argued.173  
III. SEX-BASED DISTINCTIONS UNDER TRIBAL LAW 
As might be expected given the vast diversity tribal cultures, al-
though a significant portion of tribes have prohibitions on sex 
discrimination in place, some tribes continue to make sex-based 
distinctions in their laws.  Indeed, some of the tribes that have 
enacted context-specific prohibitions on sex discrimination make sex-
based distinctions in other contexts.174   
One of the most well-known of tribal laws that makes sex-based 
distinctions is the membership rule for Santa Clara Pueblo, which has 
been reported to be still in place.175 Although most membership 
provisions appear to be sex-neutral, I identified one additional sex-
based enrollment law that favors women176 and one that appears to 
limit the rights of unmarried fathers with respect to their children’s 
eligibility for membership.177  With a few exceptions,178 most other sex-
 
 173. See Krakoff, supra note 8, at 1153 (quoting Navajo Nation Legislative Counsel 
Raymond Etcitty). 
 174. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 175. Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 50. 
 176. CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE KILAGEE TRIBAL TOWN OKLAHOMA, art. III, 
§§ 3–5, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/Kialegee_ const.htm 
(allowing children of female members to automatically become members but 
requiring case-by-case approval for children of male members whose mothers are 
from other tribes).  Sex-neutral enrollment provisions include those of the Citizen 
Potawatomi Nation and the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, among others.  See, 
e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE CITIZEN POTAWATOMI NATION, art. III, § 1, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/potawatomi_nation_const.htm; 
REVISED CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS OF THE MISSISSIPPI BAND OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, art. III, 
§ 1, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/mississippi_
choctaw_const.htm.  For a discussion of other sex-based membership provisions, see 
Rusco, supra note 100, at 284. However, the Hopi provision that Rusco discusses does 
not remain in force.  See CONSTITUTION & BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, art. II, § 2 
(1993), available at http://hopicourts.com/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid= 
50&group=13; Personal Communication with Hopi Tribal Secretary’s Office, Oct. 1, 
2008 (regarding most recent amendment of the Hopi Constitution). 
 177. FORT PECK COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUSTICE 2000, tit. IV, § 202, Group 4, 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/fortpeck_justicecode_4
.htm.  A somewhat similar provision of federal immigration law was upheld in Nguyen 
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based laws that were identified pertained to the family law context,179 
 
v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
  Additionally, I identified one sex-based voting provision but have serious 
doubts about whether it remains in force.  CONSTITUTION FOR THE ISLETA PUEBLO, art. 
II, ¶ 2, available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/isnmcons.html.  This Constitution is 
dated 1947, id., although other information indicates this Tribe’s constitution was 
revised in 1991.  See, e.g., Center for Legal Education, State Bar of New Mexico Indian 
Law Section, Tribal Justice & Court Systems, “Pueblo of Isleta Appellate Court & 
Tribal Court” 3 (2006), available at http://tlj.unm.edu/handbook/pdfs/
isleta2006.pdf.  Indeed, Rusco discusses the Isleta Pueblo Constitution in parts of his 
article but does not mention the Tribe in his discussion of tribal sex discrimination.  
Rusco, supra note 100, at 273, 284. 
 178. BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 6, § 14(1), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode6enforce.htm (allowing 
tribal police officers to command the assistance of males over eighteen years old);  
BLACKFEET TRIBAL LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 2, § 7, available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/blkftcode2civil.htm (allowing for 
imprisonment of only male debtors in cases of fraud, potential abscondment, or 
removal or concealment of property); MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBAL LAWS ANN., 24 
M.P.T.L. ch. 8, § 7(d) (2008) (providing, under the Mashantucket Pequot Uniform 
Gifts to Minors Act, for the default custodian of the minor in certain circumstances to 
be the child’s father, unless the parents are divorced and the mother has been 
awarded custody, in which case the mother becomes the default custodian); OGLALA 
SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, ch. 9, § 64 (making it a criminal offense for a man to have 
sex with an unmarried woman if she becomes pregnant and gives birth), § 103 
(defining the victim of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape as “female”), 
§ 104, available at  http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/oglala_lawand 
order9.htm (making it a crime for “any Indian” to have sex with a female under the 
age of sixteen); SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO TRIBAL CODE, ch. 31, § 31.2(10), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/sanildefonso_pueblo_tribalcode.htm 
(providing that heirlooms and other articles descend down the maternal line to 
female relatives and down the paternal line to male relatives); WHITE MOUNTAIN 
APACHE PROBATE CODE, ch. 4, § 4.11(A), available at http://www.tribalresource
center.org/ccfolder1/wht_mtn_apache_tribalcode_probate.html (providing that only 
fathers of legitimate children (with consent of the mother) and mothers of 
illegitimate children, or one parent alone if the other is incapable of consent, have 
the right to appoint testamentary guardians); see also Riggs v. Estate of Attakai, No. SC-
CV-39-04 (Navajo June 13, 2007), slip op. at 3–4, 4 n.5, available at 
http://www.navajocourts.org/NNCourtOpinions2007/09Sista%20Riggs%20v%20 E 
state%20of%20Tom%20Attakai.pdf (explaining that the tradition of prized grazing 
rights descending to female relatives should be part of the analysis in determining 
who should be awarded such rights in individual cases). 
 179. See, e.g., LAW & ORDER CODE OF THE FORT MCDOWELL YAVAPAI COMMUNITY, 
ARIZONA, art. III, § 10-34(a)(1)(d), available at http://www.tribalresource 
center.org/ccfolder1/yavapai_ftmcdowell_lawandorder10.htm (providing with 
regard to parental consent to adoption of a child that “[c]onsent is not necessary 
from a father who is not married to the mother of the child both at the time of its 
conception and at the time, of its birth, unless the father under oath has 
acknowledged [parentage] in a document filed with the court at or prior to the time 
the petition for adoption is filed, or unless the parentage of the father has been 
previously established by judicial proceedings”); OGLALA SIOUX LAW & ORDER CODE, 
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an area where sex-based distinctions have been, and to some extent 
continue to be, common in American law.180 
Two of the most interesting sex-based laws relate to traditional 
tribal governmental functions.  The Constitution of the Iroquois 
Nations: The Great Binding Law, Gayanashagowa, sets out male and 
female roles in the traditional government.181  One section provides 
that a Lord who oversteps his rightful authority will be dismissed after 
repeated warnings, and “[h]is nation shall then install the candidate 
nominated by the female name holders of his family.”182   
Another law that appears to codify tribal tradition is an alterna-
tive dispute resolution provision of the Little River Band of Ottawa 
Indians, which utilizes a “Peacemaking System” “to provide a 
traditional conflict resolution process to children, youth and fami-
lies.”183  This law provides that “[p]eacemaking sessions are con-
ducted by two Peacemakers: one male and one female to create 
balance.”184   
 
ch. 3, § 30, ¶¶ 2–3, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ 
oglala_lawandorder3.htm (providing for females to be able to consent to marriage at 
an earlier age than males and providing that males will be considered minors, and 
therefore entitled to some parental support, until they are twenty-one, whereas 
females will only be considered minors until the age of eighteen); THE LAW & ORDER 
CODE OF THE UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY RESERVATION UTAH, tit. V, ch. 
III, § 5-3-9, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/ute_ lawand
order.htm (creating presumption in custody proceedings that the mother is best 
suited to custody of the children). 
 180. See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (striking down presump-
tion in favor of mother’s custody under equal protection clause); Gordon v. Gordon, 
577 P.2d 1271 (Okla. 1978) (upholding presumption in favor of mother’s custody 
against equal protection challenge).  Note also that the U.S. Supreme Court 
continues to uphold laws treating unmarried fathers less favorably than unmarried 
mothers.  Nguyen, 533 U.S. 53 (upholding the validity of federal distinctions between 
unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers that affect a child’s ability to benefit from 
the parent’s immigration status in order to gain admittance to the United States). 
 181. CONSTITUTION OF THE IROQUOIS NATIONS:  THE GREAT BINDING LAW, 
GAYANASHAGOWA, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
iroquois_const.htm. 
 182. Id. § 25; see also Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 56 (discussing the 
allocation of authority between males and females and the primacy of women in the 
clan system of the Onondaga of New York, one of the Nations that comprises the 
Iroquois Confederacy); Onondaga Nation, http://www.onondaganation.org/. 
 183. LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS, GDA 
DWENDAAGNANANIK: PEACEMAKING GUIDELINES, §§ 1–2, available at http://www 
.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm. 
 184. Id. § 3.  Notably, a Washington state case has upheld such legally-mandated 
sex-balancing in the composition of the Washington State Democratic Committee 
against a state constitutional challenge based on Washington’s Equal Rights 
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Both the Little River Band of Ottawa Indians’ law and the Consti-
tution of the Iroquois Nations appear to be integral to preserving 
those tribes’ unique traditions.  While some tribal laws make sex-based 
distinctions that may be troubling to other Americans, it is hard to 
fathom the degree to which tribal cultures would be compromised if 
such distinctions were outlawed.185 
IV. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
It is very possible that tribal sovereign immunity could impede a 
plaintiff’s ability to enforce equal protection guarantees or tribal 
prohibitions on sex discrimination or to challenge a law creating a 
sex-based distinction.  Therefore, a brief discussion of the doctrine is 
warranted here.  Under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, 
tribes, like other sovereigns,186 are immune from suit in state, federal, 
and tribal courts, although either the tribe or the federal government 
may expressly waive this immunity.187  
However, most tribes will permit ICRA suits in which only equita-
ble relief is sought to be brought against them in tribal court.188  
Other civil rights claims based on the tribal constitution or a statutory 
 
Amendment.  Machioro v. Chaney, 582 P.2d 487, 490–92 (Wash. 1978). 
 185. See, e.g., Valencia-Weber, supra note 14, at 53–56. 
 186. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (addressing state sovereign 
immunity). 
 187. See, e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 7.05 (2007). 
 188. Taylor, supra note 43, at 253–55; see also Dupree v. Cheyenne River Sioux 
Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6106, 6108 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App.1988); 
McCallister v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, 33 Indian L. Rptr. 6057, 6061 (Confederated 
Tribes of the Grand Ronde Community Tribal Ct. 2007); Healy v. Mashantucket 
Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6189, 6191 (Mashantucket Ct. of App. 
1999); Jackson v. Kahgegab, 33 Indian L. Rptr. 6105, 6108 (Saginaw Chippewa Indian 
Tribe App. Ct. 2003); see also DeCoteau v. Ft. Peck Tribes, __ Am. Tribal L. __, 2002 
WL 34432659, *5, *7 (Ft. Peck. Ct. of App., Dec. 5, 2002) (holding that ICRA claims 
for equitable and injunctive relief may be brought against tribal officials and tribal 
employees but imposing heightened pleading requirements); accord Rosen, supra note 
23, at 509 (explaining that ICRA suits for prospective injunctive relief are usually 
allowed but that allowance of such suits does not technically constitute a waiver of 
tribal sovereign immunity); cf. Thomas v. Coquille Indian Tribe, No. C03-001, 
2004.NACQ.0000001, ¶¶ 77–78 (Coquille Indian Tribal Court, March 9, 2004), 
available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/2004.NACQ 
.0000001.htm (noting that neither the ICRA nor the tribal constitution “create[s] 
remedies in this tribal court for denial of due process or equal protection” but that, 
because the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, 
“[w]hether such remedies exist . . . is an issue to be resolved, if at all, on another 
day”). 
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bill of rights also appear to be permitted fairly commonly when only 
equitable relief is sought.189  However, more difficult issues tend to 
arise when a plaintiff seeks to sue under an ordinary tribal code 
provision.  It appears that many tribes have enacted narrow waivers for 
specific types of such claims, and thus tight filing deadlines and sharp 
limitations on the claims that may be pursued and the remedies 
available should be expected.190  In some cases, a waiver may not be 
available at all,191 although, in rare cases, plaintiffs have convinced 
tribal councils to create waivers especially for them.192  Even if no 
waiver is available, however, the policy inherent in law can still serve 
important functions and can influence community standards of right 
and wrong. 
V. OTHER AVENUES OF RELIEF 
Despite the fairly widespread existence of tribal sex discrimina-
tion laws, case law construing such laws appeared to be largely lacking.  
Given the numerous cases regarding employment-related due process 
claims, it is possible that plaintiffs who could bring sex discrimination 
claims are focusing on due process instead.193  Another possibility is 
 
 189. McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6061; Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 14 Indian L. 
Rptr. 6037, 6040 (Navajo1987); cf. Thomas, No. C03-001, 2004.NACQ.0000001 at ¶¶ 
77–78, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/2004
.NACQ.0000001.htm (noting that neither the ICRA nor the tribal constitution 
“create[s] remedies in this tribal court for denial of due process or equal protection” 
but that, because the plaintiff failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted, 
“[w]hether such remedies exist . . . is an issue to be resolved, if at all, on another 
day”).  
 190. McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6058–59; Beebe v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 32 
Indian L. Rptr. 6155, 6156 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct., July 18, 2005); Schock v. 
Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, 3 Mashantucket Rptr. 129, 1999 WL 
34828705 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Sept. 20, 1999); Bethel v. Mohegan 
Tribal Gaming Authority et al., No. GDTC-T-98-105, 1998.NAMG.0000005 ¶¶ 34–35, 
42–43 (Mohegan Gaming Disputes Ct. of App., Dec. 14, 1998), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAMG.0000005.htm; 
Long v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Auth., 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6111, 6112–13 (Mohegan 
Gaming Disputes Tribal Ct., Dec. 5, 1997); Renecker v. Tulalip Tribes, No. TUL-EMP-
11/96-667, 5 Northwest Intertribal Court System App. 1, 4–5 (May 29, 1997); 
Chatterson v. Confederated Tribes of the Siletz Nation of Indians of Oregon, 24 
Indian L. Rptr. 6231, 6231–32 (Siletz Ct. App., Oct. 9, 1997). 
 191. See, e.g., Pawnee Tribe of Oklahoma v. Fransen, 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6006 (Ct. 
Indian App. 1991). 
 192. See, e.g., Shippentower v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian 
Reservation of Oregon, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6026, 6026–27 (Umatilla Tribal Ct. 1993). 
 193. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 51, at 293 (noting that “Tribal Courts are 
inundated with personnel cases” based on due process claims).  For an example of a 
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that some tribes may take a broader view of discrimination, not 
conceptualizing it to be limited to suspect classes, and, therefore, 
plaintiffs may be bringing generic discrimination claims, rather than 
sex discrimination claims.194  Undoubtedly, however, a proportion of 
potential sex discrimination claims are not heard on the merits due to 
plaintiffs’ failure to meet the strict filing deadlines that many tribes 
apply to employment discrimination claims or claims against the 
tribe.195 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous tribal protections against sex discrimination 
in force, ranging from equal protection guarantees, to explicit broad-
based constitutional or statutory protections, to context-specific 
proscriptions against discrimination that apply in anywhere from fairly 
broad to quite narrow contexts.  Although it is difficult to generalize, 
the wording of several statutory laws and some case law suggests a 
greater concern for disparate impact than inheres in federal anti-
discrimination law.  Moreover, all of these protections evidence tribal 
 
due process case in the employment context, see Lonetree v. Garvin, 34 Indian L. 
Rptr. 6126, 6126–27 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. 2007).  
 194. See, e.g., LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS ORDINANCES & REGULATIONS, 
CH. 600, § 2.2, available at http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/
littleriver_ottawa_ordandreg.htm (prohibiting discrimination based on suspect class 
membership or “other non-merit factors”); SUSANVILLE INDIAN RANCHERIA 
CONSTITUTION & BYLAWS, BYLAWS, art. III, § 4(6), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/ccfolder1/susanvilleconst.htm (requiring the 
Tribal Council to “[c]ommit to providing an environment that is free from 
discrimination”); see generally Warner v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6084 
(Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. 2007) (addressing the possibility that the plaintiff’s 
demotion was a pretext as defined under tribal law without appearing to view the 
concept of pretext to necessarily be tied to discrimination based on membership in a 
suspect class); see also DiPietro v. Mashantucket Pequot, 34 Indian L. Rptr. 6092 
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 2007) (referring to plaintiff’s disparate treatment 
claim without mention of the claim’s being based on membership in a suspect class).  
  Yet another possibility is that the apparent lack of sex discrimination case law 
is a misperception resulting from the general difficulty of obtaining tribal case law 
compared to tribal statutory law.  See supra note 40 and accompanying text.  Although 
this difficulty may partially account for the apparent lack of tribal sex discrimination 
case law, it is doubtful that this general difficulty in obtaining case law is the only issue 
at play. 
 195. See, e.g., McCallister, 33 Indian L. Rptr. at 6058–59; Bethel v. Mohegan Tribal 
Gaming Authority et al., No. GDTC-T-98-105, 1998.NAMG.0000005 ¶¶ 34–35, 42–43 
(Mohegan Gaming Disputes Ct. of App., Dec. 14, 1998), available at 
http://www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1998.NAMG.0000005.htm; 
Chatterson, 24 Indian L. Rptr. at 6231–32. 
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policies against sex discrimination.  However, it is important to be 
realistic about the fact that all tribes do not have such protections in 
place, and, similarly to the United States, some tribes continue to 
make sex-based distinctions (including a few of the tribes that 
prohibit sex discrimination in some contexts).  Nonetheless, the 
diversity of tribal approaches to the issue of sex discrimination and 
the breadth of existing legal protections are impressive. 
More research is needed to better understand the scope, applica-
tion, and frequency of these laws.  As more tribes begin to make their 
laws available outside of their judicial systems, this research will 
become more feasible.  In the meantime, it is possible to focus in 
significant depth on individual tribes that do have codes and case law 
that either are available on the tribes’ own websites or by visiting the 
tribal courts in person.  While obtaining materials in this way is less 
likely to allow for electronic searching196 or to facilitate large-scale 
comparisons among tribes, it would be a fruitful area of research and 
would add significantly to the growing base of scholarship on tribal 
law. 
One thing that should be clear from existing information is that 
tribes collectively do not take a monolithic approach to sex discrimi-
nation and that many tribes have made a significant commitment to 
eradicating it.  Moreover, it should also be apparent that individual 
tribes’ laws can, in many circumstances, be located, albeit with some 
work. 
 
 196. For example, the Hopi Tribal Courts Website, http://hopicourts.com/ 
index.php?option=com_docman&group=13&Itemid=50, provides access to tribal 
statutory and constitutional law, as well as to appellate court decisions dating back to 
1984.  At least some of the sections of the tribal code appear to be electronically 
searchable within each document (e.g., electronic searching is possible within the 
Enrollment Code), but the tribal constitution is not electronically searchable.  
Similarly, the cases are provided in lists grouped by date and are not electronically 
searchable. 
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